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The meaning of the terminology employed within the Yoga Sutra provokes much 
academic debate. This dissertation aims to examine the meaning and use of the term 
dharmamegha samadhi within the Yoga Sutra of Patanjali. This new exploration of 
these terms is prompted by Ranganathan’s (2008) idea that dharma acts as a synonym 
for morality throughout the text and that in the dharmamegha state the yogi has 
achieved moral perfection. A study of the use of dharma and dharmamegha samadhi in 
the Yoga Sutra will allow us to draw tentative conclusions about what Patanjali meant 
by these terms and how he employed them. This will involve a close textual 
examination of the Yoga Sutra and of the writings of various translators and exegetes, 
ancient and contemporary, including several scholarly articles that have, within the past 
10 years, dealt exclusively with interpretations of dharma and dharmamegha samadhi 
within Patanjali. Further background to the historical usage of dharma and 
dharmamegha samadhi will be gained from studying the works of the other Indian 
philosophical traditions, via secondary sources. Ranganathan (2008) asserts that 
dharma/morality is at the very heart of the Yoga Sutra. The findings from this research 
suggest that whilst an ethical and moral component is found with the yama and niyama 
section of the Yoga Sutra (2.30ff), the terms dharma and dharmamegha samadhi are 
used in a specialised and highly specific manner, actually referring to the essential 
nature of something, rather than acting as a moral or ethical term. A close reading of 
Patanjali leads me to conclude that dharma and morality are not used synonymously 
within the Yoga Sutra. Additionally, the terms dharma and dharmamegha samadhi, 
when compared to other contemporaneous texts, appear to have specialised meanings 
and are used in specific ways.   
 
 
Keywords: Patanjali, dharma, dharmamegha samadhi, morality, Yoga Sutra.  
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Introduction 
 
This dissertation will examine the meaning of the term dharmamegha samadhi within 
the Yoga Sutra of Patanjali (henceforth referred to as YS). This is a timely review of this 
area of the YS and seeks to explore the ideas of Ranganathan (2008). He proposes that 
dharma is used as a direct synonym for morality in Indian philosophy and that the entire 
yoga project, as outlined in the YS, is geared towards the yoga practitioner achieving 
moral perfection. This moral perfection that finds its expression in the dharmamegha 
stage. (Note: I will use a lower case ‘y’ to refer to yoga as a practice and upper case ‘Y’ 
for Yoga, the school of philosophy). 
 
The term dharmamegha appears just once in Patanjali’s work (YS 4.29) but it is 
reasonable to assume that this samadhi state is central to the whole yogic endeavour as 
outlined in the YS. The introduction and description of the dharmamegha state appears 
within in the last ten sutra-s of the YS, at a point where the yogi is on the threshold of 
achieving kaivalyam, the aloneness that marks the fruition of the yogic journey. I will 
attempt to establish whether an accurate and plausible understanding of dharmamegha 
can be established. In order to do this I will refer a variety of translations of the YS and 
also examine the available literature on this topic by other scholars. Ranganathan’s 
hypothesis, contained in his 2008 translation of the YS, proposes the idea that the entire 
text of the YS is concerned with the moral improvement of the practicing yogi. Central 
to Ranganathan’s argument is the assumption that the term dharma is used exclusively 
as a synonym for the English word morality within in the YS specifically, and in Indian 
philosophy generally. According to Ranganathan the culmination of the yogic process is 
the attainment of the state of dharmamegha samadhi, the “Rain Cloud of Morality 
Liberating State of Absorption” (2008:299), a state of consciousness that heralds the 
moral perfection of the yogi. I wish to examine the veracity of this claim in greater 
detail. 
 
I believe that an investigation into dharmamegha samadhi is both necessary and timely. 
Since the 1990s there has been an explosion in the number of people in the West, and 
more recently in Asia generally and India specifically, practicing yoga. What those 
forms of yoga are, and how the term yoga is used or misused, often in the name of 
commercial gain, need not concern us here. What is relevant here is that many of the 
people who are undertaking forms of praxis that they define as yoga are also interested 
in exploring the philosophical underpinnings of the practices that they undertake. In 
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2008 Yoga Journal, the USA’s largest circulating yoga magazine, commissioned market 
research on yoga within American. They reported that 15.8 million people in the USA 
practiced yoga, spending over $5.7 billion a year on classes, books and products. Many 
of the books bought were translations of the YS. Ranganathan notes that the YS is “no 
doubt the most commonly translated and widely read” text of formal Indian philosophy 
and he attributes this to the “recent, global popularity of yoga, as a practice of posture 
flows” which has led to a “ubiquitous interest” in the YS (2008:1-3). When delivering 
philosophy lectures to yoga students Ranganathan found the existing translations of the 
YS problematic and was motivated to provide a new rendering of the text to overcome 
two specific objections. Firstly he believed that the moral content of Patanjali is 
generally overlooked by translators and secondly that commentators frequently read 
contrary systems of philosophy into the text of the YS. Many currently available 
translations of the YS are in some way problematic. Most YS translations offer extensive 
commentary on the first two of the YS’s four pada-s (chapters), but have little to say 
about the remaining two pada-s that complete the text. From 20 years of personal 
inquiry and experience as an asana teacher working with western yoga practitioners, the 
bias towards the first two pada-s is clearly reflected in the knowledge of most students, 
many of whom are largely unaware of the content of the YS’s third and fourth pada-s. 
The privileging of certain sections of the YS allows distortions in the nature of yoga 
practice and its accompanying philosophy. Ranganathan’s translation is attempts to 
overcome the specific drawbacks that he perceives plague modern translations. He 
states that “a distinct feature of Patanjali’s system ... is his moral philosophy” (2008:62) 
which finds its sine qua non in the state of dharmamegha, something outlined in the 
fourth pada exclusively. The focus of other translations toward the first half of the YS 
therefore distorts the true meaning of Patanjali’s thoughts on yoga practice, its means 
and its ends. As we shall discover, few scholars have concerned themselves with an in 
depth examination of the concept of dharmamegha. Ranganathan has attempted to place 
the dharmamegha, and its implications for the yogi, at the centre of his translation by 
arguing that dharma is used exclusively by Patanjali as a synonym for morality. He 
attempts to demonstrate that the whole yogic enterprise is geared towards the moral 
perfection of the yogi, finding its expression in the dharmamegha state. 
 
I have reviewed a number of translations of the YS including that of Ranganathan. I 
believe that drawing on the available translations and scholarship pertaining to the YS it 
is impossible to come to a universally acceptable definition of the dharmamegha state 
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that fully expresses the meaning it held for Patanjali. During a certain epoch the term 
was obviously philosophically significant and pregnant with practical meaning, as its 
usage is not confined to the YS. The term appears in a range of Buddhist literature and 
some Hindu sources outside of Patanjali but remains relatively obscure. My argument is 
based on three factors. Firstly, the number of scholars devoting their time to exploring 
the dharmamegha is limited, as the focus of their efforts usually falls on other, more 
well trodden, parts of the YS. Until more scholars devote time to understanding 
dharmamegha its meaning will remain clouded. Secondly, I will demonstrate there is no 
commonly held understanding of the implications of dharmamegha between those 
scholars who have examined the term in depth. An attempt to reconcile the existing 
scholarship is long overdue. Finally I will argue that due to the polyvalence of its 
meanings any definition of dharma, whether in a limited philosophical or in a more 
general sense, is unlikely to completely convey the meaning that the word held for 
Patanjali. By extension this means that teasing out a precise meaning for dharmamegha 
is problematic. 
 
A number of issues presented themselves in the completion of this work. Firstly, the YS 
is written in Sanskrit, a language that I have a limited understanding of. I will therefore 
be comparing secondary sources, English translations, of the YS. Translation of the YS is 
sometimes problematic as it is written in the form of terse aphorisms (sutra-s) where the 
normative rules of grammar are often ignored. Many of the sutra-s, which range in 
number from 194 to 196 depending on which edition you consult, lack a verb and this 
can allow a wide and often contradictory range of meanings to be derived from one 
sutra. I have referred to a number of translations and commentaries in order, as much as 
possible, to overcome this problem. Translations can sometimes be overtly 
overshadowed by an exegete’s desire, conscious or unconscious, to read into the source 
text their own ideas and views. There is, for instance, a notable tendency by some 
translators to read the YS through the filter of other, competing philosophical 
viewpoints, most notably the Advaita Vedanta school of philosophy or from a crypto-
Buddhist perspective. It is hoped that by referring to multiple translations these biases 
can, where they exist, can be noted and observed. Since so many translations of the YS 
exist selecting translations judiciously, with an eye on their particular biases, will help 
me to develop a balanced picture of what the source text is actually saying. An 
additional problem is that almost two millennia separate us from the original text. The 
meaning of words and phrases changes over time as language and culture evolve and we 
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must be careful to avoid reading modern ideas into historical texts. Finally, the YS is a 
work of philosophy. We must be clear to establish whether the words and terms in the 
YS are being used in a highly specialised, technical philosophical manner or in the 
vernacular. Cross-referencing with other philosophical texts roughly contemporaneous 
with Patanjali can help us to gauge how terms were used technically.  
 
In order to achieve my two stated aims I will firstly introduce some background to the 
YS, its author and its composition. I will offer a brief investigation into the translation of 
the term dharmamegha to ascertain whether a workable and agreeable English 
translation can be accomplished. I will then examine some of the philosophical 
underpinnings of the Patanjala Yoga darsana (system of philosophy) and establish the 
degree to which Patanjali drew his ontology from the Sankhya darsana, another of the 
astika or orthodox darsana. (Orthodox means that the darsana in question accepts the 
authenticity of the revelations of the Vedas and is therefore acceptable to Brahmins). A 
survey of astika and nastika (non-orthodox) literature for references to dharmamegha 
samadhi will demonstrate whether other philosophical strands are discernible within the 
YS. From there we will then investigate the two different types of samadhi that Patanjali 
explains; samprajnata (samadhi with consciousness) and asamprajnata (super-
conscious samadhi) (YS 1.17,18). An examination of these two categories will then 
allow an exploration of whether the dharmamegha samadhi falls into either of these 
categories or if it is of another type of class of experience completely. I will then 
examine how Patanjali uses the term dharma throughout the YS to see if that can 
develop our understanding of dharmamegha. Finally, I will question the claims of 
Ranganathan that the whole text of the YS is orientated to the moral perfection of the 
yoga practitioner.  
 
An Overview of the Yoga Sutra  
 
The YS is the canonical work of the Yoga darsana , one of the six astika darsana of 
Indian philosophy. “A darsana, obviously, is not a system of philosophy in the Western 
sense (darsana means view, vision, understanding, point of view, doctrine, etc.); it 
comes from the root drs meaning to ‘to see’, that is to contemplate, to understand, etc. 
But it is nonetheless a system of coherent affirmations”  which aims “to deliver man 
from ignorance” (Eliade 1976:11). Many controversies exist regarding the translation 
and meaning of the philosophy of the YS. In this thesis I wish to examine just one of the 
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controversies, the usage and meaning of the term dharmamegha samadhi. The term 
appears once in the YS (4.29) but, coming at the summation of the entire Patanjalian 
yogic process, its importance should not be overlooked.  
 
We have no substantial biographical details regarding the life of Patanjali, the supposed 
author of the YS. The name means one who has fallen – pat – into the hands when they 
are held in the anjali mudra – with the two palms touching. This gives us little to work 
with. Even to date the Patanjali who authored the YS is difficult. Eliade says that 
“nothing is known of him. It is no known even whether he lived in the second or the 
third century before Christ or even in the fifth century after Christ” (1976:13). Doniger 
(2009:505) sees somewhere around 150 BCE as the composition date for the YS but 
most recent scholarship tends toward a more modern date. Ranganathan suggests 
somewhere “around the second or third century CE” (2008:1) and this is supported by 
Whicher (1998[a]:1). Older scholars and most modern day yoga teachers, Indian or 
otherwise, tend to ascribe a much earlier date to Patanjali. Perhaps this is an example of 
antiquity frenzy, the assumption that the greater the antiquity of an idea or a text, the 
greater the authority it bestows. The name Patanjali appears in association with two 
texts in addition to the YS. The Mahabhasya (Great Commentary) on Panini’s 
Ashtadhyayi, a Sanskrit grammatical treatise, is ascribed to a certain Patanjali the 
Grammarian. Additionally, a work on ayurveda is also ascribed to a Patanjali. It is 
generally agreed by academics that these three texts were almost certainly not written 
contemporaneously or by the same author. Focusing on Patanjali the Yogi, Whicher 
(1998[a]:317 footnote 134) states that although “the historical identity of Patanjali the 
Yoga master is not known, we are assuming that Patanjali was, as the tradition would 
have it, an enlightened Yoga adept.” Ranganathan supports this view, arguing that 
because “the Yoga Sutra is the most definitive account of yoga” it must have been, by 
extension, written by a great Yogi (2008:2). 
 
The YS is a collection of sutra-s divided into four pada-s. Traditionally, the key to 
understanding each sutra-s is held to be via reading commentaries on the YS by later 
exegetes and then studying the YS with a living guru. Vyasa (circa 5
th
 century CE) is 
almost universally believed to have been the earliest extant YS commentator. His bhasya 
(commentary) is therefore widely seen as the most authoritative and is the foundation on 
which other exegetes build their commentaries. This may not be the complete picture 
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for three reasons. Firstly we do not have a manuscript of the YS without Vyasa’s 
bhasya. Indeed the 
 
“recently released critical edition of the first chapter of the Patanjalayoga has 
confirmed that there is no manuscript evidence in favor [sic] of the autonomous 
existence of a Yogasutra (YS). Manuscripts present a whole text, the 
Yogasastra, later divided into two parts, YS and Yogabhasya (the latter 
traditionally attributed to Vyasa). The extraction of a YS from the Yogasastra is 
evidently possible, but it is not obvious whether the result is a coherent work 
that conveys a clear message” (Ferraz 2009:249). 
 
Rather than being a name Vyasa may in fact be a title. It literally means the “arranger” 
or “compiler” (Monier-Williams 2002:1035). The title Vyasa is given to the compiler of 
the Vedas (Veda-Vyasa), and to the author of the Mahabharata (MB) and the Puranas. 
Given the vast period of time between the compositions of these texts it is clear that 
they were not authored by one individual, regardless of Indian tradition which supposes 
common authorship of the three texts.  
 
Secondly, certain scholars are now casting doubt on the internal unity of the YS. 
Rukmani argues that the YS is a “bringing together of various yogic traditions” by 
Patanjali and that it is an attempt to “systematise and arrange in an orderly way the 
various yogic traditions” which had large followings at the time of the composition 
(1989:147). For Rukmani this is most obviously displayed in YS 1.33–39 where a 
multitude of practices to achieve steadiness of the citta (mind) are described. None are 
given preference. Several scholars suggest that the YS is not an original composition but 
rather was complied by Patanjali from a number of different texts. Feuerstein (1979) 
divides the text into two, a “Kriya Yoga Text” extending from 1.1 to 2:27 and from 3.3 
or 3.4 to 4.34, and an “Astanga Yoga Text” from 2.28 to 3.2 or 3 and including 3.55. 
Deussen (1920) and Hauer (1958) argue that the text of the YS was pieced together from 
amalgamating five different texts. However, they disagree with each other on the exact 
origin of each sutra. It is reasonable to assume that Patanjali was drawing on material 
that was contemporaneous but also on ideas that predated him and it is obvious that a 
variety of disparate influences exist within the YS. Chapple concludes that these 
“speculations are possible” but adds that “Vyasa does not in his commentary mention 
these ‘sub-texts’ or refer to different traditions or authors. Nor does the style of Patanjali 
indicate that he in fact is borrowing texts from others” (1994:88). The idea that Patanjali 
was a compiler (a vyasa?) of existing ideas and texts aside, there seems to be an 
assumption that once composed the YS has remained unchanged over time. We must not 
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forget that it is not “impossible that the original text of the Yoga Sutras may have been 
revised by many hands in order to adapt it to new ‘philosophical situations’” (Eliade 
1976:14) and separating the original core text from the later additions may be difficult, 
if not impossible, to do. 
 
Thirdly, the general absence of grammatical structure and the terse nature of each sutra 
in the YS often suggests ambiguity and this has allowed the text to be interpreted and 
reinterpreted over the centuries in a variety of, sometimes contradictory, ways. Modern 
day yoga teachers almost uniformly use the YS as a source text to authenticate and 
validate their particular types of praxis. For example, YS 2:46 tells us that sthirasukham 
asanam – that posture (asana) should have the dual qualities of stability (sthira) and 
comfort (sukham). Traditionally the word asana meant the posture of sitting. Only 
much later did the word come to refer to a variety of physical contortions which might 
better be termed tapas (austerities). Despite this the overwhelming majority of Modern 
Postural Yoga (MPY) teachers use YS 2:46 to authenticate a plethora of posture-based 
‘yoga’ practices (which they term asana) and legitimise their ‘traditions’ (De Michelis 
2004). However the modern day style of posture flows of the MPY practitioner that YS 
2:46 is used to legitimise were unknown before the early modern era (Singleton 2010). 
Some yoga teachers even used terms from the YS when naming their yoga styles. 
Examples abound, such as K. Pattabhi Jois (1915-2009) who named the strenuous 
posture-based practice that he taught “Astanga Yoga”, referring to the eight-part path 
outlined in the second pada of the YS, and the practices taught by Paramahansa 
Yogananda (1893-1952), which he labelled as “Kriya Yoga”, referring to YS 2.1. 
 
I noted above that sutra-s often appears to be ambiguous, but is this idea warranted? 
Rukmani (1989 [4]:151), one of the foremost translators of the YS, clearly believes not. 
She states that a “sutra has to be short and unambiguous.” Certainly Patanjali starts the 
YS by clearly stating the aim of yoga:  
 
yogas cittavrttinirodhah 
 
“Yoga is the cessation of the fluctuations of the mind” (Chapple and Viraj 
1990:33).  
 
Contrary to the assertion of Rukmani, Ranganathan argues the exact opposite, 
emphasising that it is the exegete’s job to accurately represent what each individual 
sutra means. He states that each “line of a sutra, or the individual sutra verse, is 
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comprised of words chosen for their multiple significances. The more significances a 
word can conjure, the greater work each verbal component of a sutra can play in 
compressing a large text within short, dense lines” (2008:31). My limited knowledge of 
Sanskrit makes it difficult to assess whether the claims of Ranganathan or of Rukmani 
are correct, but it is clear that any work of philosophy is open to (mis-) interpretation. 
Consider how the Nazis manipulated the work of Nietzsche. Regardless of whether 
Patanjali was seeking specificity or ambiguity, it is clear that over time multiple 
interpretations have developed for many of the sutra-s. Clearly, the emphasis of the text 
has been shifted to accommodate the changing ideas and mores of new eras. The YS is 
largely concerned with the various stages of meditation and with siddhi (powers). 
Almost all of the third pada, approximately one quarter of the YS, is concerned with the 
gaining of siddhi. In spite of the clear weight of the YS towards samyama (binding 
together) and the acquisition of siddhi these types of praxis are almost unknown in the 
modern era. We are separated from the composition of the YS by approximately two 
millennia. Given that language usage evolves and changes I would argue that accurately 
assessing exactly what Patanjali means in any particular sutra or phrase can sometimes 
be extremely challenging and perhaps impossible. Despite this reservation, I wish to 
examine one of the key phrases of the YS, dharmamegha samadhi, attempting to 
discover if an accurate and unambiguous meaning for the term can be found. The phrase 
appears just once in the YS, towards the end of the fourth, and final, chapter (YS 4.29):  
 
prasamkhyane’pi akusidasya sarvatha viveka-khyater dharma-megha-samadhih.   
 
“In the case of one who has no interest left even in the highest state of elevation 
(prasamkhyana) (and) who has continuous insight (vivekakhyati), there arises 
the samadhi known as dharmamegha” (Rukmani 2009:132).   
 
Dharmamegha samadhi is an unusual term, rarely found in Indian literature. I wish to 
explore if we can accurately translate it into English. Certainly Ranganathan (2008) 
believes that the term is easily translatable. But is this is not, I believe, the whole story.  
 
Translating dharmamegha samadhi   
 
Translation theory is a complex and specialised academic field. For the purposes of this 
thesis space does not permit a detailed examination of the pertinent issues. That being 
said, it seems axiomatic that most modern translations of the YS, regardless of whether 
they are translated by academics or others, are seeking to present a translation that is 
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accurate to the spirit of the text and linguistically meaningful to the modern reader 
rather than simply offering a word-by-word breakdown of the text, an approach often 
found in older translations. The work of Chapple and Viraj (1990) is an example of a 
text which offers us everything: a definition and grammatical analysis of each 
individual word and term within the YS and also a meaningful English translation. 
Certain words and terms within the YS consistently trouble translators. Many translators 
choose to simply leave the terms in the original Sanskrit, allowing the reader to attribute 
their own meaning to the word. Other translators attempt to find English synonyms. 
Both approaches have their benefits, but we shall leave that open for the moment.  
 
Dharmamegha samadhi is a term that has proved problematic to translators since the YS 
was first encountered by Europeans. I shall give a brief definition of the term now and 
re-examine it in more depth later. Klostermaier observes that “the term dharmamegha 
has not yet been studied properly” (1984:208) and therefore finding an approximation in 
English that adequately conveys its meaning is difficult. There is a long standing 
academic interest in the dharmamegha. “Starting with Mircea Eliade, who worked 
intensively in the field of Yoga, scholars have been intrigued by the concept of 
dharmamegha-samadhi. There is no uniform understanding of this important stage in 
samadhi among Yoga scholars” (Rukmani 2007:131). So what did Eliade, the man who 
started the interest in dharmamegha, have to say on the matter? He states that “Dharma-
megha-samadhi, the ‘cloud of dharma,’ (is) a technical term that is difficult to translate, 
for dharma can have many meanings, but that seems to refer to an abundance (‘rain’) of 
virtues that suddenly fill the yogin” (Eliade 1990:84). Eliade makes no attempt to define 
or to explain these “virtues”, what they are and how they “fill” the yogin. Perhaps the 
difficulty in translating dharmamegha samadhi is due, as Eliade points out, to the 
polyvalent meanings of the word dharma. Let us examine the phrase more closely and 
see what we discover. The phrase dharmamegha samadhi is a composed of three words; 
dharma, megha and samadhi. 
 
Dharma, which is masculine word and comes from the root dhr meaning “to hold.” 
Monier-Williams informs us that dharma means “that which is established or firm, 
steadfast decree, statute, ordinance, law.” Following these come synonyms such as 
“morality, religion, religious merit, etc.” (2002:510). With reference to the YS Taimni 
points out that the “significance of the phrase Dharma-Megha will become clear if we 
assign to the word Dharma the meaning ... of property, characteristic or function” 
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(1986:432). He then points out that this definition of dharma is drawn by referencing YS 
4.12, one of the few sutra-s in which Patanjali uses the word. The relative merits of this 
line of inquiry will be developed more fully later. 
 
Meghah, which is masculine and takes the nominative, singular case. Megha means “a 
cloud” or “a mass” (Monier-Williams 2002:831) and is “a technical term used in Yogic 
literature for the cloudy or misty condition through which consciousness passes in the 
critical state of Asamprajnata Samadhi when there is nothing in the field of 
consciousness” (Taimni 1986:433). 
 
 Samadhih, a feminine word, in the nominative singular, has multiple meanings. These 
can include “putting together” and “bringing into harmony.” Samadhi also means 
“concentration of the thoughts, profound or abstract meditation, intense contemplation 
of any particular object” and is the name for “the eighth and last stage of Yoga” as well 
as being “the fourth and last stage of Dhyana” for Buddhists (Monier-Williams 
2002:1159). In order to completely understand Patanjali it is crucial to develop an 
understanding the concept of samadhi within the YS according to Kesarcodi-Watson. He 
argues that “samadhi most literally means, ‘together (or, same)-joining (or, bringing).’ It 
refers to the ‘oneness’ we must attain to know the true-nature of anything” (1982:79). 
Chapple and Viraj agree, translating samadhi as “absorption” or “putting together”, 
citing the two roots sam (together) and dha (to place) which combine to form the word 
(1990:41). Monier-Williams actually lists and translates dharmamegha as a specific 
phrase. It is, he says, “a particular Samadhi” and mentions that it is one “of the 10 
Bhumis” of the Buddhists. He makes no mention of it in relation to the YS, even though 
it was a text known to him (2002:511). 
 
Discerning the elements of Sankhya within the Yoga Sutra of Patanjali.  
 
Of the six Indian astika darsana there are clearly close links between the Yoga and the 
Sankhya darsanas. The two terms are often used together, as if reflecting two sides of 
the same coin; Sankhya as theory, Yoga as praxis. For example, in the second chapter of 
the Bhagavad Gita (BG) Krishna exhorts his warrior disciple Arjuna to fight in the 
forthcoming fratricidal (and therefore potentially adharmic) battle which is about to be 
waged at Kurukshetra in order to maintain and uphold dharma. Krishna outlines to 
Arjuna the theory of the immortal atman and tells His disciple that to fight would 
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enhance Arjuna’s reputation, whereas to flee would only bring shame upon the warrior. 
Arjuna remains, at this point, undecided. Krishna persists, and in BG 2.39 he tells 
Arjuna: 
  
 esa te’bhihita samkhye, buddhir yoge tvimamsrnu   
  
 “This wisdom has [now] been revealed to you in theory; 
 Listen now to how it should be practised” (Zaehner 1973:139). 
 
The clear implication here is that Sankhya is the theoretical underpinning of Yoga. 
Sankhya, meaning “enumeration” or “discriminating” (Monier-Williams 2002:1199), 
“appears to be a very ancient school of thought” (Ranganathan 2008:44) with “roots that 
date from the time of the Upanishads and [that] are important in the Mahabharata 
(especially the Gita)” (Doniger 2009:505). In the MB Sankhya-Yoga is repeatedly 
referred to and the terms often seem synonymous. Since the oldest parts of the MB are 
acknowledged to have been extant by 400 BCE (Brockington 1998:26), it is safe to 
assume that the linking of Sankhya and Yoga was a standard convention by the time 
Patanjali authored the YS, and “codified yogic practices that had been in place for 
centuries” (Doniger 2009:505). The Sankhya darsana also has origins that can be traced 
back to the Charaka Samhita, an ancient Indian medical treatise, written around 300 
BCE (Dasgupta 1997:213-217). Sankhya was once a “widely influential school to judge 
from references to it in the Mahabharata and kindred literature” (Hiriyanna 2005:267), 
unlike today where Vedantic thought tends to dominate philosophical matters in India. 
The Sankhya school is said to have been founded by the sage Kapila but there is no 
evidence to prove or disprove that texts attributed to him, the Sankhya Pravacanana 
Sutra and the Tattvasamasa, were actually composed by him. Kapila cannot be easily or 
accurately dated, but if he existed it would seem that he lived around 500 BCE.  
 
The canonical text of the Sankhya darsana is the Sankhya Karika (SK) of Isvarakrishna, 
written sometime early in the common era, perhaps around the third century CE 
(Doniger 2009:505). In the SK Isvarakrishna tells us that he belongs to an unbroken 
tradition of succession from Kapila, but this claim cannot be authenticated. Currently 
the YS is widely regarded as the canonical work of the Yoga darsana, but there are 
many other works on Yoga, both earlier and later than the YS, which could be 
considered equally authoritative. It is highly likely that the YS preceded the SK by 
several centuries. In the YS it is clear that Patanjali did “make great use of the dualism 
of Sankhya,” taking his “basic cosmology, and some of his metaphysics” from the 
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Sankhya darsana, but this “was not his only inspiration” (Ranganathan 2008:44-45). 
There are also Vedic, Jain, and Buddhist elements in the YS. There may also be 
influences from unknown sramana (ascetic renunciation) traditions that have added 
elements to Patanjali’s darsana. Certainly Sankhya “undergirds Patanjali’s arguments 
(especially sutra-s 2.15-27)” (Chapple 1998:150), with Yoga borrowing “to a large 
extent its ontology and epistemology from the allied system of Sankhya” (Rukmani 
1989:196). However simply  
 
“to foist, as many have done, this radical dualistic perspective – one that has 
been inherited from interpretations of Classical Samkhya – onto Patanjali's 
system results in a parochialization and trivialization of Classical Yoga, 
marginalizing its importance and reducing its overall integrity as one of the six 
major orthodox Hindu darsanas” (Whicher 1998[a]:291).  
 
However the “distinctly Sankhya idea, that persons are absolutely passive spectators 
and that all activity in life is a function of Nature” (Ranganathan 2008:45), is not 
apparent in Patanjali, where we see demonstrated that the philosophy of “Yoga, in 
contradistinction to the Samkhya teachings, recommends the active approach” 
(Jakubczak 1999:177), for individuals. The active role of agents in Patanjali has positive 
outcomes when ascending towards liberation as, according “to the Patanjala Sankhya 
theory, dharma (merit) can only be said to accrue from those actions which lead to 
man’s salvation; and adharma (demerit), from the quite opposite course of conduct” 
(Dasgupta 1989:73). Here Dasgupta uses dharma to indicate the merit derived from an 
action, rather than the morally-infused action that Ranganathan would have us believe is 
the characteristic of the liberated yogi. 
 
Rather than seeing the Sankhya and Yoga darsana as compatible yet mutually distinct, 
it might be advantageous to see Patanjali’s YS as a work of pre-SK Sankhya. There are 
certainly elements of “proto-Sankhya or Sankhya in the making” in the epics (Hiriyanna 
2005:106) and it seems entirely reasonable that many versions of Sankhya existed 
before its eventual codification by Isvarakrishna. One key noticeable feature in the 
development of the Sankhya darsana is that the early “Sankhya philosophers argued 
that god may or may not exist but is not needed to explain the universe; later Sankhya 
philosophers assumed that god does not exist” (Doniger 2009:505). According to this 
criterion Patanjali could be offering us a style of early Sankhya since in the YS (1.23, 
1.24, and 2.1, 2.32, 2.45) he makes reference to Isvara, the Lord. Some modern 
scholars, such as Ranganathan, acknowledge the existence of elements of Sankhya 
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within the YS but then often tend to fixate on reasons why the YS should not be seen as a 
work of Sankhya, due to discrepancies between the YS and the SK. Rather than 
acknowledging areas of philosophical evolution, this line of argument assumes that 
there existed an unchanging, fixed Sankhya philosophy for many centuries before 
Isvarakrishna codified it in the SK. We know that the Sankhya doctrine predates 
Patanjali, and since we can confidently assume that Isvarakrishna wrote the SK, the 
canonical work of Sankhya, some centuries after Patanjali, we might argue that the YS 
represents an authentic, but pre-Isvarakrishna, version of Sankhya. Perhaps the YS 
describes one amongst many competing expositions of Sankhya. Indeed Dasgupta 
repeatedly refers to the “Patanjala Sankhya” and the YS is often referred to as the 
Patanjali Sankhya Pravacanana (1989:66, 69, and passim). No text exists within a 
vacuum. We might agree that the “originality of Patanjali within the Indian tradition 
begins with the manner in which he blends and synthesises the various traditions he 
draws from” (Ranganathan 2008:59) but we must also acknowledge that all texts draw 
on other earlier as well as contemporary sources. There is nothing original or unique in 
blending other people’s ideas to formulate your own ontological system. Not to do so 
would be impossible. There are a number of key logical problems within the philosophy 
of the Yoga darsana and therefore propose that yoga should be taken more “as a 
discipline to be followed rather than to be understood intellectually” (Rukmani 
1997:623). Perhaps Patanjali and Vyasa, (remembering that this title seems to have been 
“given to any great typical compiler or author” (Monier-Williams 2002:1035) 
synthesised what they considered the best of the traditions available to them. Bronkhorst 
(1984:209) suggests that the text of the YS was composed by the author of the 
accompanying Yogabhasya, Vyasa with the bhasya containing the comments and 
background notes of the individual who compiled the YS. Bronkhurst however argues 
that there are some mistakes in the organisation and ordering of the sutra-s that lead to 
interruptions in the flow of the text.  
 
One might also question whether the YS could always legitimately claim to be the 
canonical work of the Yoga darsana. Patanjali is almost universally assumed by most 
modern day MPY enthusiasts and teachers, both in Indian and the west, to present the 
quintessential exposition of ‘Classical Yoga’. This of course assumes that at some 
historical time there existed a form of praxis that we can label as ‘Classical Yoga’. The 
YS is then used, as previously noted, to legitimise and authenticate a whole range of 
practices and beliefs, many of which are not included or even hinted at within the text of 
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the YS. The YS has therefore come to symbolise and authenticate contemporary yoga 
practice in its myriad of forms. “It is by no means self-evident, as many modern 
practitioners assume, that the YS has always been the ultimate authority on the practice 
of yoga, nor indeed that Classical Yoga has ever really constituted a distinct practice 
lineage in its own right” (Singleton 2008:78). It is arguable that the idea of the YS as 
both the philosophical underpinning of the Yoga darsana and as a practice manual is a 
late modern idea, as “among mid-nineteenth century orthodox Benares Pandits, 
Patanjala Yoga was simply not a living philosophical system” (ibid:80). Certainly many 
yoga traditions, such as the Saivite sects, have their own body of texts and do not rely 
on Patanjali for authentication of their practices and beliefs. And many of these yoga 
traditions were being practiced in mid-nineteenth century Benares, totally decoupled 
from the legitimisation and authority of Patanjali. Yoga practice has a rich and diverse 
history which draws from a variety of sources, written and oral. It seems unrealistic that 
a text written almost two thousand years ago is, or ever could be, universally accepted 
by all yoga practitioners as authoritative as there “exist uncountable ‘popular’ forms of 
yoga, which are not systematized, and there are also non-Brahman yogas” (Eliade 
1976:10). Perhaps, as Singleton suggests, the prominence of the YS is more a reflection 
of modern Orientalist scholarship and of Vivekananda’s visit to the World Parliament of 
Religions in Chicago in 1893 than it is of historical longevity. “It seems clear that the 
particular status enjoyed by the YS in the modern age itself derives greatly from various 
endorsements of the text’s authority by early modern translators and scholars on the one 
hand and by Vivekananda himself on the other” (Singleton 2008:80).   
 
Within the text of the YS there are undoubtedly many strands of Sankhya philosophy 
alongside ideas drawn from other intellectual traditions that were prominent at the time 
of composition. Ranganathan diminishes the influences of other traditions on Patanjali 
when we writes that “Patanjali wrote a distinct text called the ‘Yoga Sutra’” and not a 
“text titled Sankhya Sutra or Yoga of Advaita Vedanta.” This version of events plays 
down the importance that Sankhya and other darsana play in Patanjali’s text. Vyasa 
clearly uses the term Patanjala Sankhya Pravacana when referring to the YS. Contrary 
to Ranganathan, Dasgupta clearly believes the YS to be a particular Sankhya school of 
philosophy, calling it the “Patanjala Sankhya doctrine” (1989:71). The term 
dharmamegha is not one that is used by Isvarakrishna in the SK. Neither is it a term that 
is used in other works, such as the BG or the MB that draw close associations between 
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Sankhya and Yoga. We will therefore need to look for evidence to see whether 
dharmamegha samadhi is a term that is used in other texts and traditions. 
 
Other textual references to dharmamegha samadhi 
 
The term dharmamegha samadhi does occur within texts other than the YS and its 
commentaries. Two astika texts mention the term and several nastika (non-orthodox) 
Buddhist texts use the term. When looking for references to dharmamegha in Hindu and 
Buddhist sources  
 
“Western scholars of Indian literature, not restricted by traditional Indian 
orthodoxies, and not bound by the astika-nastika exclusivism, quite early 
pointed out that the Yogasutra and Buddhist texts on meditation had rather much 
in common. It became one of the major points of scholarly debate whether 
Buddhism borrowed from Yoga or Yoga from Buddhism. Apart from that 
controversy, their study focussed on verbal expressions common to Buddhist 
texts and the Yogasutras” Kloistermaier (1986:254). 
 
Awareness of the usage of dharmamegha outside the YS can help us to develop a fuller 
picture of the possible meanings of the term within Patanjali. We can then try to 
establish links between the various Indian philosophies and acknowledge the debt that 
the various traditions owe each other. As Klostermaier has pointed out “in spite of some 
polemics against some Buddhist schools, both the terminology and the underlying 
philosophy of the Yogasutra suggest close connections” between the two schools even 
though Yoga is astika and Buddhism nastika (1984:205). For Sectarian practitioners 
this inter-relatedness is sometimes difficult to acknowledge, but nothing exists within a 
vacuum. Buddhism in its initial phases was largely a reworking of existing yoga 
techniques. It drew from, and developed alongside, multiple forms of yoga praxis in 
India, many of which may be unknown. By the time of the composition of the YS 
Buddhism had become powerful politically, culturally and intellectually in India. Whilst 
the YS has very close links ontologically to Sankhya “it is highly probable that in his 
metaphysics of time” and in certain other areas, “Patanjali was directly inspired by the 
high-powered speculations of the Sautantrika Buddhists” (Feuerstein 1982:95). Indeed 
there is a strong Buddhist essence that runs throughout many areas of the YS. 
 
Klostermaier states that he knows only one astika work outside the YS that mentions 
dharmamegha samadhi; Vidyaranya’s Pancadasi (VP). In VP 1.60 dharmamegha 
samadhi is described as the highest stage to be reached in yoga. The dharmamegha is 
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“that condition in which the mind gradually abandons the notion of meditator and 
meditation (dhyatrdhyane parityajya) and is merged in the object of meditation 
(dhyeyaikagocaram).” In the state of samadhi the mind is likened to a steady flame of a 
lamp in a well-sheltered place (nivatidipavat cittam). BG 6.19 is used in support of this 
idea. Achieving this dharmamegha samadhi destroys all of the karma accumulated by 
the yogi over innumerable lives and allows the “growth of pure dharma (suddho dharmo 
vivardhate).” Additionally the text tells us that the experts in yoga call this samadhi 
dharmamegha because it pours “forth countless showers of the nectar of dharma 
(varsaty esa yato dharmamrtadharas sahasrasah).” The net of vasana (unconscious 
dispositions) is destroyed and all karma (accumulated impressions), whether 
meritorious or non-meritorious (punyapapakhye karman) is destroyed (Klostermaier 
1986:253-4). This description sounds very similar to the YS’s description of 
dharmamegha in YS 4.26ff where Patanjali proposes that, in the state of dharmamegha, 
the samskaras cease to function and the yogi remains in an uninterrupted state of 
absorption. As the VP can be dated to the 14
th
 century CE it is clearly drawing on, and 
making use of ideas expressed by Patanjali.  
 
Building on Klostermaier’s work Feuerstein points out that the dharmamegha samadhi 
is “also defined (in similar ways) in the Adhyatma Upanisad (38) and the Paingala 
Upanisad (3.5)” (1987:342). The Adhyatma Upanisad (AU) explains the purity of the 
soul and talks about the relationship between humans and Lord Brahma as well as the 
power of the Lord. It “is the Seventy-third among the 108 Upanisads and forms part of 
the Sukla-yajur-veda, after dealing with the exposition of the real form of the innermost 
Atman of all beings, it ends with the description of the eternal verity of the character of 
Narayana” (Ayyangar 1941:12).The AU is very similar in wording and essence to the 
VP. It states: 
  
“By (the practice of) this (Samadhi), the crores of Karmas, accumulated through 
the beginningless cycle of births in this world, meet with dissolution and pure 
Dharma increasingly thrives. The most exalted knowers of Yoga call this 
Samadhi, the Dharma-megha, for the reason that it rains, in thousands, showers 
of the nectar of Dharma. (37, 38)  
“When the hosts of Vasana-s (previous impressions) have been completely 
dissolved through this (Samadhi) and the accumulated Karmas, known as Punya 
(virtuous) and Papa (sinful), uprooted root and branch, what secret lay hidden in 
the Vedic Text before, manifests (itself) as Sat, (existence), rid of all obscurity, 
and the direct knowledge (of the Atman) is generated, as of the fruit of the 
myrobalan placed on the palm of the hand” (39,40)” (Ayyangar 1941:21). 
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Meanwhile the Paingala Upanisad (PU), which also belongs to the Sukla Yajur Veda 
(Radhakrishnan 2008:901), is in the form of a dialogue between Yajnavalkya and his 
pupil Paingala. It discusses meditation, the nature of the world and the nature of release 
of the soul. PU (3.5) contains the following line:  
 
 tato’yoga-vittamah samadhim dharma-megham prahuh  
  
 “Therefore the adept in yoga call this highest enlightenment ‘the cloud of 
 virtue’” (Radhakrishnan 2008:915-6). 
 
Radhakrishnan footnotes the term dharmamegha, stating that “the realised soul is 
virtuous by nature” (ibid). There is no mention however of what specific virtues the 
realised soul actually has. It is difficult to date either the AU or the PU. Radhakrishnan 
notes that Sankara (circa 788-820 CE) refers to the PU in his Brahma Sutra Bhasya, 
which would date it, like most Upanisads, as being extant before the eighth century 
(ibid:21). It is therefore slightly more challenging to chronologically place this text in 
relationship to Patanjali and to determine any relationship which might exist. It is 
reasonable to assume that both the AU and the PU were composed after Patanjali. They 
are therefore either drawing on his ideas or reiterating ideas about a concept that was 
well known by yoga practitioners of the period. Link the YS the AU and the PU refer to 
the dharmamegha as the pinnacle of the yogic experience but they shed little light on 
the technical meaning of the dharmamegha. 
 
From these brief references we get an overall impression of dharmamegha samadhi. 
Karma, whether black, white or grey, is destroyed and the yogi becomes established in a 
field (in the scientific sense) of pure dharma or virtue. We are no clearer as to what 
constitutes the field of pure dharma however. Is it, in the positive sense, the uplifting of 
the yogi to a point of moral perfection as Ranganathan would have us believe, or is it 
something else? What is the dharma that the yogi holds? If dharma is, as Ranganathan 
believes, a synonym of morality, what are the characteristics of this moral perfection? It 
can be argued that ideas pertaining to morality are specific to culture, time and place 
and that there are no underlying ideas or activities that are purely and intrinsically 
moral. Below we shall see how Ranganathan uses the yama rules (YS 2.30, 31) as an 
expression of a universal and timeless morality. This is, I will argue, a questionable 
assumption. We are aware that, negatively, dharmamegha samadhi is a state where the 
residual seeds of karma and vasana have been destroyed, but this describes only what is 
not there. The YS does not offer a description of what it actually feels like to be in the 
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dharmamegha state. Since the interplay of the guna-s, the idea that characterises normal 
existence, has ceased, it is possible to conclude that the experience of the yogi in the 
dharmamegha is the exact opposite of everyday life. 
 
If our limited Hindu sources, all of which are highly Vedantic in leaning, cannot help 
us, perhaps casting our net wider to include Buddhist texts will allow us to flesh out our 
understanding of dharmamegha. This is covered in detail in Klostermaier who cites the 
work of a number of other scholars. I shall give a brief overview of Klostermaier’s work 
(Full references are available in Klostermaier 1986). Louis de la Vallee Poussin’s Le 
Boudhisme et le Yoga de Patanjali, written in the 1930s points to a parallelism between 
“YS IV, 26 ff and the Buddhist systematization of bhumis (stages) which the 
bodhisattva has to master.”  Additionally Emile Senart wondered if the dharmamegha 
of yoga was merely a synonym of the “ambrosia of law” that a bodhisattva experiences 
at the highest level. The German J.W. Hauer’s pioneering study Der Yoga als Heilsweg 
contains the line “Dieser Ausdruck stammt aus dem Buddhismus”, literally “this term 
(dharmamegha samadhi) is drawn directly from the Buddhists.” Hauer clearly assumes 
that the YS is using a late Buddhist term and also using it in its Buddhist sense, which he 
takes to mean “the sustaining primeval power of the universe.” This is supported by the 
Dasabhumikasutra, a Mahayana Buddhist text which, according to P.L. Vaidya, 
“occupies a position of paramount importance in the Mahayana system of thought.” 
Here dharmamegha is explicitly mentioned as the last bhumi (stage), and other late 
texts, which extensively enumerate the stages of progress of the Bodhisattva.” 
Klostermaier (1986:255) develops these ideas when he writes that  
 
“modern interpreters, Indian as well as non-Indian, while recognizing the 
Buddhist flavor (sic) of an expression like dharmamegha, and being – on the 
whole – quite open to the mutuality of influences between early Buddhism and 
early forms of Yoga, have not – as far as I can see – actually tried to utilize 
Buddhist texts to throw some light on this strange term and the stage of 
development of the yogin it describes.”  
 
The Buddhist sources cited by Klostermaier, and there are many, list a number of stages 
that an aspirant must pass through, but “neither the number of bhumis nor their names 
are uniform in the various Mahayana texts which deal with the ascent of the 
bodhisattva” (1986:259). This, in itself, is not so important. Various texts within the 
same Indian traditions often contain minor deviations of form and content yet retain 
canonical status. For example, Patanjali proposes the astanga (eight-part) path of yoga 
(YS 2.28ff): yama (restraint), niyama (observances), asana (postures), pranayama 
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(control of breath), pratyahara (withdrawal), dharana (concentration), dhyana 
(meditation), and samadhi (absorption) (Chapple and Viraj 1990:69). The Maitri 
Upanisad (MU 6.18) describes a sadanga (seven-limbed) yoga practice comprising 
pranayama, pratyahara, dhyana, dharana, tarka and samadhi. Tarka, contemplative 
inquiry, replaces asana as an anga. The MU contains “material from different periods.” 
There are links to the Taittiriya, one of the earliest Upanisads, but the “main body of it 
appears much later, and includes references to astronomical ideas that were probably 
not current until the second century CE” (Roebuck 2003:XXV). Yama and niyama 
which Patanjali includes as angas are omitted. The YS lists five yama and five niyama. 
In contrast the much later Hatha Yoga Pradipika (HYP), authored by Swatmarama 
around the 14-15
th
 century CE, describes ten yama and ten niyama, but does not list 
them as specific yoganga-s (HYP 1.17-18). If we then turn to the Gheranda Samhita 
(GS) (circa 16th century CE) we find the saptasadhanam satkarma, a list of the seven 
acts of yoga, asana, mudra, pratyahara, pranayama, dhyana and samadhi (GS 1.9-11). 
Despite the differences outlined above between Patanjali, Swatmarama, Gheranda and 
the MU all are still accepted as authoritative by yoga practitioners. 
 
Klostermaier has examined the Buddhist literature for dharmamegha references and 
surveyed the work of other scholars working on Buddhist texts. He concludes that 
neither the number of bhumis nor their names are uniform in the various Mahayana 
texts which deal with the ascent of the bodhisattva. Seven bhumis are listed in Asanga’s 
Yogacarabhumi. The highest is called Nisthagamana and is compared by Nalinaksa 
Dutt, the editor of the text, with dharmamegha. D. Seyfort Ruegg mentions a text in 
which dharmamegha is listed as the eleventh stage, just before the twelfth and final one. 
Candrakirti’s Madhyamakavatara attempts to fit the paramitas (perfections) in with the 
ten bhumis: “the tenth bhumi – Dharmamegha – is taken to be the Buddhabhumi, 
though complete Buddhahood is still far off.” The Lalitavistara describes how “the gods 
persuade the Bodhisattva residing in the Tusita heaven to descend to earth again – in 
which the motive of the rain-cloud and the cessation of afflictions are brought together 
with the coming of the Buddha.” The Madhyanasutralathakra describes dharmamegha 
as the highest bhumi by those who are about to reach complete mukti (liberation), where 
the karmas are completely known after they have ceased to be an obstacle. H. V. 
Guenther, refers to a Tibetan work which enumerates the ten bhumis, naming the last as 
‘Cloud of Dharma’ (dharmamegha) which “extinguishes the raging fire of all kinds of 
instability.” (Full references are available in Klostermaier 1986).  
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So where does that leave us? The Hindu references to dharmamegha above offer little to 
work with. They are relatively obscure and, to my knowledge, only have recently 
authored commentaries. Additionally they appear to all postdate Patanjali. I am inclined 
to believe that dharmamegha seems to be a term used to describe an advanced state 
where klesa (afflictions) and karma have both ceased to trouble the yogi. The “use of 
the term dharmamegha samadhi in YS IV, 29 does not appear to be arbitrary or purely 
technical in the sense that Patanjali could have chosen another term, as a quark could 
well be known by any other name” (Klostermaier 1986:260). The yogi appears to be 
residing on the very cusp of kaivalyam or Buddhahood. Rain is therefore an apt 
metaphor as it “extinguishes fire, washes away impurities, and provides a necessary 
condition for growth” (ibid). Here however, Klostermaier offers a significant difference 
between the yogi and the Buddhist. We have accepted that the distinction between 
“dharmamegha samadhi and the kaivalya of Yoga, or between bodhisattvahood and 
Buddahood at the stage of dharmamegha of Buddhism, is virtually imperceptible”  
(ibid). This state, however it is framed, implies a disinterested flow of discriminative 
insight (viveka). However a key distinction exists. The Buddhist bodhisattva will forego 
heaven and instead rain down the dharma on those still afflicted by the klesa-s and by 
karma. Dharmamegha here represents “the state of the bodhisattva who is ready to 
enter nirvana but no longer strives for it, instead spontaneously bestowing the blessing 
of insight on others” (Collins (2009:70). According to the YS, the effects of 
dharmamegha, exist for the individual yogi alone. However, whether bodhisattva or 
yogi, dharmamegha samadhi represents “ideal forms of culture” (ibid), a utopia ideal 
that offers a truly “authentic culture” (ibid). The essence of which is gaining “insight 
into the true nature of purusa and prakrti” (ibid). 
 
Types of Samadhi within the Yoga Sutra: Samprajnata and Asamprajnata 
 
If we are going to examine the role of dharmamegha samadhi within the YS we should 
be aware of how Patanjali discusses samadhi within the YS text. Following the 
precedent set by Vyasa most interpretations of the YS agree that two different types of 
samadhi are outlined by Patanjali in YS 1.17 and 1.18. They are samprajnata (samadhi 
with consciousness) and asamprajnata (super-conscious samadhi).  
 
vitarka-vicara-ananda-asmita-rupa-anugamat samprajnatah 
virama-pratyaya-abhyasa-purvah samskara-seso’nyah 
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“Samprajnata  [arises] from association with discursive thought, reflection, 
bliss, and I-am-ness.  
“The other (state) has samskara only and is preceded by practice and intention 
of cessation” (Chapple and Viraj 1990:40).  
 
Ranganthan translates this as: 
 
“The cognitive state focusing on the single object (for example, the person) can 
be brought about by logical analysis, introspective inquiry, bliss or the keen 
awareness of individuality. 
“The other (state of) abiding is preceded by a condition of cessation, in which 
only the stores of residual imprints remain” (Ranganathan 2008:91, 92). 
 
The distinction between the two states mentioned in YS 1.17,18 is seemingly clear. The 
state called samprajnata has four elements to its experience: vitarka (discursive 
thought), vicara (reflection), ananda (bliss), and asmita (I-am-ness). Patanjali implies 
that any one of the four elements outlined in YS 1.17 can produce the samprajnata state. 
In the samprajnata stage the mind develops prajna, discriminative knowledge, but that 
prajna is not deep seated and “occasionally the phenomenal states of consciousness are 
seen to intervene” (Dasgupta 1989:102). Prajna as well as “the high-level 
discriminative vision (also called prasamkhyana in the texts) is the fruit of 
samprajnata-samadhi” (Whicher 1998[a]:283-5). This is gained by the constant 
orientation towards cessation (cittavrttinirodhah, YS 1.2) gained in the samprajnata 
state. In the early stages of correct practice the yogi enters the samprajnata state and 
prajna dawns but the yogi is still using one of the four seeds (bija) of vitarka-vicara-
ananda-asmita in order to achieve the state of cessation. The “ethical problem of the 
Patanjala philosophy is the uprooting of avidya by the attainment of true knowledge of 
the nature of the purusa” (Dasgupta 1989:101). By constant practice of abiding in the 
samprajnata state the yogi slowly destroys avidya and overcomes the need to have 
seeds to establish the mind in cessation and the flow of prajna becomes constant. YS 
2.1, 2, which states that 
 
 tapah-svadhyaya-isvara-pranidhanani kriya-yogah 
 samadhi-bhavana-arthah klesa-tanu-karana-arthas ca 
  
 “Austerity, self-study, and dedication to Isvara are kriya-yoga. 
 “[It is] for the purposes of cultivating samadhi and attenuating the afflictions” 
 (Chapple and Viraj 1990:57). 
 
The five afflictions (klesa-s) to be attenuated are outlined in YS 2.3, 4. Avidya, delusion 
or lack of wisdom, is the main affliction that confronts individuals. This avidya is the 
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origin of all of the other afflictions; asmita (a sense of I-am-ness), raga (attraction), 
dvesa (aversion), and abhinivesah (the desire for continuity). All practice by the yogi 
must therefore be directed towards the uprooting of avidya (non-wisdom) as “the 
uprooting of the avidya, with its vasana-s, directly follows the attainment of true 
knowledge called prajna, in which the state the seed of false knowledge is altogether 
burnt and cannot be revived again” (Dasgupta 1989:101). This then is asamprajnata, 
the other stage. Here the yogi is established in knowledge without the need for external 
seeds and this stage is often thought to be synonymous with dharmamegha. 
 
It is the refinement of samprajnata samadhi which leads to asamprajnata samadhi. The 
“process of ‘cessation’ (nirodha) deepens from cognitive (samprajnata) (YS 1.17) 
samadhi into supracognitive (asamprajnata) samadhi where it can be said that the seer 
abides in its own form/intrinsic identity (tada drastuh svarupe’vastanam)” (Whicher 
1998[a]:283-5). The resting of the seer in its own form or intrinsic identity results from 
cittavrttinirodhah (YS 1.2), the cessation of the mental modifications. “The other 
(state)” of YS 1.18 is, following the precedent set by Vyasa, is asamprajnata samadhi. It 
is characterised by the presence of samskara; what Ranganathan calls “residual 
imprints”, alone. In the asampranjnata state only the residual imprints, the samskara 
toward samadhi produced by spending considerable time in the samprajnata state, 
remain. Asamprajnata samadhi is a more refined samadhi state brought about by 
spending considerable time in, and following directly from, samprajnata samadhi.  
 
What then is the relationship between samprajnata samadhi, asamprajnata samadhi, 
dharmamegha samadhi and kaivalyam, the isolation denoting the end of the yogic 
journey? Is asamprajnata samadhi the stage before dharmamegha samadhi or are the 
terms synonymous? Perhaps confusion about the specific states being examined is 
certain since dharmamegha and asamprajnata are amongst the 11 terms “introduced by 
Vyasa very early under the second sutra of Samadhipada” and they are “being used 
more or less in the same sense” (Rukmani 1997:619). The practice of samadhi “leads 
directly to kaivalya. It (samadhi) is divided into a lower and a higher form known 
respectively as samprajnata and asamprajnata samadhi. The latter is the goal, the 
former serving but as a stepping-stone to it” (Hiriyanna 2005:296). This simple 
bifurcation into a lower and higher form of samadhi holds a myriad of more subtle 
layers as “there are many stages in samprajnata and asamprajnata samadhi-s” 
(Rukmani 1997:614) and the yogi will oscillate between them until their practice is 
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firmly grounded. Using the imagery of the yogi passing through a raincloud, Taimni 
says that after becoming firmly established in samadhi the “passage through the 
Dharma-Megha-Samadhi completes the evolutionary cycle of the individual and by 
destroying Avidya, completely and for ever, brings about the end of Samyoga of Purusa 
and Prakrti” (1986:433).  
 
This view is reinforced by Watson who believes that “a-samprajnata can only refer to 
kaivalya-expressing samadhi, the oneness also called, dharmameghasamadhi,’ which 
Taimni correctly interprets to mean, ‘oneness devoid of all thingness (dharma)-
befogging (megha)’” (1982:87). This view is also supported by Whicher (1998[a]:283-
5) “dharmamegha-samadhi is more or less a synonym of asamprajnata-samadhi and 
can even be understood as the consummate phase of the awakening disclosed in enstasy, 
the final step on the long and arduous yogic journey to authentic identity and 
‘aloneness.’” This aloneness is kaivalyam, mentioned in the final sutra of the YS as the 
culmination of the yogic process. However it is only by becoming permanently 
established in the prasamkhyana state (discriminative discernment) that “there arises the 
‘cloud of dharma’ samadhi’” (Whicher 1998[a]:283-5) and aloneness (kaivalya) follows 
as the result. Dharmamegha samadhi is also seen to follow from the awakening of 
vivekakhyati (discriminative discernment) and “presupposes that the yogin has 
cultivated higher dispassion (para-vairagya) – the means to the enstatic consciousness 
realized in asamprajnata-samadhi” (ibid). This is the precursor to aloneness. For 
Taimni there is a clear distinction between the asamprajnata state and kaivalyam and 
the dividing line is the entering and passing through the dharmamegha state. Before 
passing through dharmamegha, the raincloud of dharma, there exists for Taimni the 
possibility of the yogi’s purusa falling backwards out of the asamprajnata stage, 
leaving the samadhi state completely, and becoming re-enmeshed in maya (illusion) and 
samsara (conditioned existence). It is only after passing through the dharmamegha 
stage that “the process is irreversible” and thereafter it “is not possible for the Purusa to 
fall again into the realm of Maya from which he has obtained Liberation” (1986:433). 
“The borderline between the dharmamegha samadhi and the kaivalya of Yoga ...is 
virtually imperceptible: it is only a question of fulfilment of a process, which from then 
on has only one direction” (Klostermaier 1986:260). Indeed Ranganathan supports this 
view when he says that dharmamegha samadhi is the event that changes the yogi into 
someone who is no longer a practitioner but instead has accomplished the very goal of 
yoga, the kaivalyam state. There is apparently no “practice of yoga after the 
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dharmameghasamadhi.” The cessation of the practice of yoga is because the 
“dharmameghasamadhi liberates the yogi” and allows him to rest in kaivalyam 
permanently (2008:301). 
 
Samadhi is also explained by Patanjali (YS 1.46 and 1.51) as having two other 
characteristics, a simple and straightforward division into sabija and nirbija (with and 
without a seed). These terms are again, more or less synonyms for samprajnata and 
asamprajnata. There are eight sabija samadhi-s “plus one other possibility” (Watson 
1982:8), the possibility of seedless samadhi. All samadhi-s with “articulable views” of 
the Self portray the Self as “some manner of object” and are “in other words, 
samprajnata. As such, they cannot truly be of me” (ibid). The difference between 
samprajnata and asamprajnata samadhi “lies in the presence or absence of a Pratyaya 
in the field of consciousness”, a pratyaya being a “technical word used in Yoga to 
denote the total content of the mind … using the mind in its widest possible sense” 
(Taimni 1986:34). If there is a pratyaya, or seed, the “direction of the consciousness is 
from the centre outwards” (ibid). This is samadhi with a seed, sabija. So, if 
samprajnata or sabija samadhi are not the full experience, since traces of the Self 
remain, “the only possible kind of understanding, hence of knowing-oneness, of me, the 
unmitigated self, must be at once nirbija and a-samprajnata. If I can effect this, I then 
have effected dharmameghasamadhi, that ‘oneness lacking in all thingness-befogging’” 
(Watson 1982:89). If the samadhi is asamprajnata, and hence without a seed (nirbija), 
“there is nothing to draw the consciousness outwards” (Taimni 1986:34). At this point 
the seer must rest in its own true nature (YS 1.2-4), rather than taking the forms of the 
mental fluctuations and this is kaivalyam, the final form of asamprajnata samadhi, 
where “the buddhi is thus concentrated on the self, it vanishes once for all, leaving the 
purusa apart and alone” (Hiriyanna 2005: 296). 
 
From the reading of YS 1.17,18 and Vyasa’s bhasya there is both an historical precedent 
and a convention that samprajnata and asamprajnata are samadhi states. Ranganathan 
acknowledges that he gives “special place to the classical Sanskrit commentary of 
Patanjali’s Yoga Sutras by Vyasa” (2008:28). However, in this instance, he seems quite 
willing to dismiss the Vyasa’s ideas. Ranganathan completely rejects the ideas that 
samprajnata and asamprajnata are samadhi states. He translates samprajnata as 
“cognitive trance” (2008:91) and distinguishes it from samadhi, the “liberating states of 
absorption” (ibid: passim). Ranganathan refutes the generally held opinion of most 
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commentators that samprajnata and asamprajnata are samadhi states. Firstly he points 
out that Patanjali does not directly refer to samprajnata or asamprajnata as samadhi 
states. We are usually “obliged to understand Patanjali as intending the full range of 
meanings associated with a word” (ibid:91) and despite what Vyasa says we should, in 
this case, ignore the convention that samprajnata and asamprajnata are samadhi-s for 
two clear reasons. Firstly Ranganathan argues that Patanjali is “very critical of 
intellectual reasoning” (ibid) and therefore because vitarka (logical argument) is 
mentioned as being present in relation to samprajnata it cannot be a samadhi state. 
Ranganathan draws our attention to YS 1.47 to support this argument. His translation 
might be said to be rather embellished, hence I have contrasted his translation with that 
of Chapple and Viraj.  
 
nirvicara-vaisaradya’dhyatma-prasadah 
 
“The skilled, clear intellect that eschews (discursive) inquiry has the disposition 
of tranquility and good humour belonging to the real self” 
(Ranganathan 2008:122). 
 
“In skill with nirvicara, clarity of authentic self arises.” (Chapple and Viraj 
1990:20). 
 
Additionally Ranganathan believes that Patanjali clearly distinguishes between samadhi 
and states of bliss, a spiritual ‘buzz’. He mentions that YS 3.3 draws a clear distinction 
between true absorption (samadhi) and bliss.  
 
tad-evartha matra-nirbhasam svarupa-sunyam-iva-samadhih 
 
“Its only purpose is the singular radiance that reveals one’s nature (or essences 
in general) and nothing else – on the way to this goal comes the liberating state 
of absorption (samadhi)” (Ranganathan 2008:213). 
 
“When the purpose alone shines forth as if empty of own form, that indeed is 
samadhi” (Chapple and Viraj 1990:24). 
 
I remain unconvinced by Ranganathan’s argument here. His refutation of the views held 
by the overwhelming majority of scholars and practitioners alike since the time of the 
Vyasa seem insubstantial and the sutra-s he draws our attention to do not seem to 
particularly support or add weight to his views, despite his somewhat elaborate 
translations. Ranganathan is clear that many translations of the YS “are produced by 
yogic practitioners, whose primary concern is not historical or philosophical (or 
historical) accuracy” yet he seems at this point to be falling into the same trap by 
rejecting the precedent of Vyasa (2008:24).  
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Ranganathan’s basic argument is that dharmamegha samadhi is the pinnacle of the 
yogic experience, but that it is not directly linked to or synonymous with the 
asamprajnata samadhi state. As we saw above, Whicher has pointed out that 
dharmamegha samadhi seem to be a refinement of the samadhi state of asamprajnata. 
YS 4.26-29 would seem to support this. Here Patanjali explains that although the mind is 
directed towards kaivalyam at the later stages of the yogic process breaks still arise in 
the intention towards cessation due to the existence of residual samskara. It is by the 
eventual cessation of the samskaras that the mind can rest, uninterrupted, in the state of 
dharmamegha samadhi, an extension of the asamprajnata samadhi. Vyasa would seem 
to support this. His bhasya on YS 4.29 states that “due to the dwindling away of the 
seeds (samskara) of subliminal-impressions, other thoughts do not arise. Then he attains 
the ‘samadhi’ known as ‘dharmamegha’” (Rukmani 1989:120).  
 
Patanjali’s use of dharma in other contexts in the Yoga Sutra 
 
If we are seeking to understand the term dharmamegha samadhi an investigation into 
Patanjali’s usage of the term dharma in other contexts within the YS is necessary. The 
word dharma appears in four sutra-s (YS 3.13, 3.14, 3.46, 4.12) outside of YS 4.29, the 
dharmamegha samadhi sutra. (Note: YS 3.46 appears as 3.45 in certain editions of the 
YS, such as Chapple and Viraj, which omit sutra 3.20 and thus have only 195 sutra-s). 
Patanjali tells us (YS 3.13,14) that: 
 
Etena bhuta-indriyesu dharma-laksana-avastha-parinama vyakhyatah 
Santoditavyapadesya-dharmanupati dharmi 
 
“By this the property, character, and condition-transformations in the elements 
and the sense-organs are also explained.  
“The substratum is that in which the properties – latent, active or unmanifest – 
inhere” (Taimni 1986:301-304). 
 
There are three parinama-s, or types of transformations, that relate to the sense organs. 
These parinama-s are dharma, transformation of the property or essential nature of the 
element, laksana, transformations of the character or definition of the element, and 
avastha, transformation of the condition of the element. Mastery over these three 
parinama-s, gained by intense and prolonged sadhana (spiritual practice), allow the 
yogi to control or manipulate natural phenomena. This mastery then allows the yogi to 
“exercise extraordinary powers which are called Siddhis” (Taimni (1986:301). A 
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description and exploration of these siddhi-s forms the main subject of the YS’s third 
pada. YS 2.18 explains how the action of the bhuta-s, the five fundamental elements 
which make up all matter, on the indriya-s, the five human senses, leads to sensual 
perception. The specifics of this theory of perception need not detain us here. What is 
clear however is that it is the action of the bhuta-s on the physical and chemical 
properties of matter which “make us see colours, hear sounds and produce the 
innumerable sensations which form the raw material of our mental life” (ibid:302) and 
that the bhuta-s, by their action on the indriya-s, “produce all kinds of sensuous 
perceptions” (ibid). It is the properties of the bhuta-s, in their totality, which “are called 
Dharma in the present context” (ibid:302). Indeed the appearance is called “the dharma 
(the attribute) and that particular arrangement of atoms or guna-s which is the basis of 
the particular appearance is called the dharmin (the substance)” (Dasgupta 1989:60) and 
the “basic medium or repository of all properties is called Dharmi in the next Sutra 
[YS3.14]” (Taimni 1986:302). Dharmi is clearly identified as a collective noun for the 
“basic medium in which all properties have become latent and the Dharmi is present in 
a perfectly quiescent state” (ibid). This dharmi has no moral or ethical component for 
Taimni or Dasgupta, it is merely a technical word denoting the collection of all 
properties, a basic and underlying substratum and this substratum “which is the root of 
all properties is none other than Prakrti” (ibid). Dharmi, in the masculine, nominative 
singular form, means the “holder of dharma” being composed of the word dharma plus 
the Sanskrit possessive suffix “in”, (Chapple and Viraj 1990:85-6), where dharma 
means “nature, character, essential quality” (ibid). Dasgupta states that the state of 
prakrti is one in which “the gunas perfectly overpower each other and the 
characteristics (dharma) and the characterised (dharmin) are one and the same” 
(1989:36). He then goes on and describes the relationship between the dharma and the 
dharmin extensively (ibid:62ff). The dharmin, as the substance, is something that 
remains constant whereas the dharma refers to its present quality or appearance. He 
uses the metaphor of a piece of earth. The piece of earth can appear in multiple forms, 
as dust, as a lump or as a piece of pottery. The earth is a common characteristic of all of 
these forms whether they are latent (santa), current (udita), or unpredictable 
(avyapadesya, the potential future states). The earth element is a constant (dharmin) but 
its appearance changes due to time and potential. The change is referred to as 
dharmaparinama.  
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Rather than following the convention that dharma and dharmin refer to the essential 
nature of an object Ranganathan focuses on what he sees as the inherent moral elements 
of these terms. In both YS 3.13 and 3.14 he translates dharma as meaning “moral, 
ethical, virtue, evaluatable [sic] characteristic or principle” (2008:223-4). In YS 3.14 he 
translates dharmi as “that which does good by something else, that which upholds it, 
substance, fundamental character” (ibid). He believes that the “yogi not only 
understands the particular marks of sensory objects, but also their generic moral 
character” (ibid), and this generic moral character can be “understood as referring to the 
guna-s that characterize objects of sensory perception” (ibid). This means that the 
ultimate aim of Nature is to allow the yogi the “appreciation of the moral significance of 
objects and events.” This is something that I find problematic in two ways. Firstly, 
Ranganathan’s translation of dharma and dharmi is confusing. He continually, 
unceasingly and unerringly, insists on dharma having a moral or ethical element in each 
and every context and allows no wider meaning for the words. He does not specifically 
link dharmi to its root dharma as Chapple has done, nor does he acknowledge the 
word’s polyvalent meanings. To me, Ranganathan appears to be reading his morality-
focused interpretation into the text, rather than allowing the YS to convey its own 
message. If dharma has a moral element then dharmi, its possessive form, must have a 
moral element too. Ranganathan’s translation of dharmi as “that which does good by 
something else” is vague and forced. The second potential problem here is 
Ranganathan’s idea that everything in Nature has a generic moral character linked to the 
theory of the guna-s. Patanjali (YS 2.15-26) outlines his theory of the operation of the 
guna-s. From YS 2.15 we learn that 
 
 parinama-tapa-samskara-duhkhair guna-vrtti-virodhac ca duhkham eva sarvam 
 vivkinah 
  
 “For the discriminating one, all is dissatisfaction, due to the conflict of the 
 fluctuations of the gunas and by the dissatisfaction due to parinama, sorrow, and 
 samskara” (Chapple and Viraj 1990:62-63).   
 
This dissatisfaction can be avoided however. Its cause is the union of the seer with the 
seen. As we were told in YS 1.2-3 if we achieve citta-vrtti-nirodhah, the cessation of the 
mental fluctuations, the link between the seer and the seen will be severed and the seer 
will rest in its own true nature (tada drasstuh sva rupe’vasthanam). YS 2.18 tells us that 
the purpose of the guna-s is twofold, to give the purusa experiences but also to allow 
liberation, called here apavarga. We are also told in YS 2.26, that 
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 viveka-khyatir aviplava hanopayah. 
  
 “The means of escape is unfaltering discriminative discernment” 
 (Chapple and Viraj 1990:67-68). 
 
 “The uninterrupted practice of the awareness of the Real is the means of 
 dispersion (of  Avidya)” (Taimni 1986:200). 
 
At no point here is there any mention of the generic moral character of the world or of 
Nature. The means of escape is “unfaltering discriminative discernment” of the Real 
from the non-Real, not moral perfection. Having the discernment to discriminate 
between purusa and prakrti, between avidya (ignorance) and prajnata (knowledge), and 
between the parinama of the guna-s are the marks of this viveka or discrimination. The 
guna-s exist to provide the playing field on which the yogi may find kaivalyam, but 
there is no mention here that the gunic field has any inherent characteristics other than 
those of prakasa (light), kriya (activity) and sthiti (remaining inert) (Chapple and Viraj 
1990) as Patanjali (YS 2.18) denotes the three forms of the guna-s which are more 
commonly denoted as sattva, rajas and tamas (light, activity and inertia). No other 
commentator or translator I could find emphasises, as Ranganathan does, the guna-s as 
having a specifically moral element. Nature exists to allow the yogi to achieve 
kaivalyam, but objects do not have to have a generic moral character as Ranganathan 
insists. Ranganathan mentions (2008:154) that in YS 2.18 that the term sila is used. 
 
 prakasa-kriya-sthiti-silam bhutendriyatmakam bhogapavargartham drsyam  
 
 “The seen has the qualities of light, activity, and inertia, consists of the elements 
 and the senses, and has the purposes of experience and liberation” (Chapple and 
 Viraj 1990:64). 
 
 “Luminosity, action and stillness are the morally praiseworthy conduct of the 
 elements constituting the nature of things seen. Their purpose (in existing)  is to 
 provide edifying experiences for the sensory apparatus and thus facilitate 
 liberation of the purusa” (Ranganathan 2008:153). 
 
Sila is translated as “quality, character, nature” (Chapple and Viraj 1990:64) and as 
“habit, custom, usage” (Monier-Williams 2002:1079). Ranganathan (2008:153) goes 
further with his translation and sees sila as denoting “social morality, conduct, good 
behaviour, principle of conduct.” Certainly Monier-Williams suggests that in the MB 
the term sila is used to denote morality and he then goes on to link sila with the 
Buddhist paramitas (perfections). Here I would argue that Ranganathan seems to be 
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erring into a selective reading of the YS. Again he seems to be reading his theory, that 
the whole of the Patanjalian project is centred on the moral perfection of the yogi, into 
the text rather than allowing the YS to speak for itself.  
 
As we have seen above a jug will be made of the dharmin or substance of earth and will 
contain a combination of the three elements of the guna-s in that state. I find it difficult 
to see how my water-carrying vessel has an inherent and active ethical role to play in 
my life. Ranganathan seems to be arguing that Nature is teleologically geared to 
allowing purusa-s to understand their true form. Using teleological in its wider sense, it 
might imply that the wider goal of Nature is to assist the purusa in achieving its goal of 
kaivalyam. He has to carefully translate YS 2.21 in order to maintain this line of 
argument. He tells us that  
 
 tad-artha eva drsyasyatma 
  
 “The only purpose of what is seen is (to serve) the self” (Ranganathan 
 2008:157). 
 
The addition of “to serve” in parentheses gives the impression in Ranganathan’s 
translation that Nature actively facilitates the purusa in the pursuit of kaivalyam. Indeed 
in his commentary on this sutra he adds that “Nature is goal-directed” and that the “goal 
of Nature is to help purusa-s gain liberation.” I would argue that this overstates the case. 
From YS 2.18 we learn that prakrti, the seen, has two functions, to provide experience 
and liberation for the purusa. There is no implication that the seen is actually doing 
anything, it is merely the field of play in which experience and liberation occur. The 
seen is not actively working towards the liberation of the individual purusa; Nature is 
not “goal directed” as Ranganathan insists. The seen merely exists as the stage on which 
the drama unfolds as Vyasa points out in YS 3.13 where he states that “the action of the 
gunas consists in ceaseless activity. The nature of the gunas is said to be the reason for 
the activity of the gunas” (Rukmani 1987:22). 
 
The commentary on YS 3.13 is the longest exegesis by Vyasa of any sutra in the YS. 
This implies that this sutra is at the very heart of the yoga hermeneutic. Throughout the 
bhasya there is no mention of the dharma or dharmin having a moral or ethical 
component. Indeed translating dharma and dharmin as meaning moral within the 
bhasya would render the commentary meaningless. Moving forward, YS 4.12 states 
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Atitianagatam svarupato’sty adhva-bhedad dharmanam. 
 
“The past and the future exist in their own (real) form. The difference of 
Dharmas or properties is on account of the difference of paths” (Taimni 
1986:403). 
 
Ranganathan tells us that that dharma, a term he translates as “moral character”, “might 
be Patanjali’s way of referring to the guna-s, which are each ethical qualities working in 
unison to bring about the liberations of persons” (2008:283, my italics). Writing at 
length about the relationship between the dharma and the dhamin Dasgupta (1989) at no 
point mentions or even hints at dharma having any kind of moral element. We are told 
by Ranganathan that “Nature moves closer to its morally praiseworthy goal of liberating 
persons” (2008:283) yet there seems to be a contradiction here. Ranganathan believes 
that “Patanjali regards liberation to be a direct result of the effort that persons put into 
the practice of yoga, geared as it is to moral perfection” (ibid). When critiquing Advaita 
Vedanta and Sankhya Ranganathan states that “in both systems, ethics, or dharma, does 
not directly lead to liberation, but at best to more favourable circumstances, such as 
birth in heavenly regions” (ibid). Indeed “morality can be a distraction from liberation” 
(ibid) in the Advaita Vedanta system of Sankara in stark opposition to Patanjali view 
that “dharma, or ethics, is essential to the achievement of liberation for all” (ibid). So is 
the individual yogi working towards liberation, or does Nature and the guna-s also have 
a moral role to play? It is usually thought that the guna-s exist in their varying quantities 
and qualities in all things but are essentially passive in the role of the yogi’s liberation.  
 
Ranganathan’s translation of YS 2.23 implies that the yogi can use Nature as the 
backdrop on which to achieve liberation.  
 
 sva-svami-saktyoh svarupopalabdhi-hetuh samyogah 
 
“The reason for the conjunction of (persons with Nature) is (to grant persons) 
the powers to  be their own spiritual masters and to apprehend their own form” 
(Ranganathan 2008:159). 
 
It also breaks away from the usual convention that insists that a yogi cannot become 
established in kaivalyam without the assistance and guidance of a guru. It does not 
imply that Nature has any role in the actual work towards liberation. Therefore, why is 
Nature and the guna-s ethical or moral? If “Prakrti is the state of the equilibrium of the 
gunas” they can in no way “be of any use to the purusa” which is generally held to be 
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eternal, as “all other states are held to be non-eternal as they are produced for the sake 
of the purusa” to experience life (Dasgupta 1989:36).  
 
The “path taken by the course of events, if we analyse it carefully, is nothing else than a 
particular series of phenomena in a particular order, each element of this series, in its 
turn, being nothing more than a particular combination of properties or Dharmas which 
are all inherent in Prakrti” (Taimni 1986:405). The dharma-s referred to here are a-
moral properties or characteristics. Taimni’s assertion that the path taken by a course of 
events is just a sequence of phenomena infers that the moral element is in the reaction of 
the yogic practitioner to external circumstances, rather than the circumstances 
themselves having an inherent moral component. In effect, it’s not what happens but 
how you react that matters. And, as we all know, various individuals, due to their 
unique conditioning (samskara and vasana), will react quite differently to the same set 
of circumstances. One man’s meat is another man’s poison. The reaction to events is 
where the morality is apparent, but it is the morality of the individual that will become 
clear, rather than events and objects having an inherent moral element to them. 
 
In the second half of the third pada of the YS there is a description of many of the 
siddhi-s (powers) that a yogi can acquire via samyama, the practice of dharana, dhyana 
and samadhi. Ultimately the yogi can gain mastery over the pancabhuta-s, the five 
essential elemental materials of which the world is comprised. YS 3.46 describes the 
culmination of these siddhi-s. 
 
 tatah-anima-adi-pradurbhavah kaya-sampat tad-dharma-anabhigatas ca 
 
 “From these arise powers such as the ability to become as small as an atom, and 
 to manifest a perfect body. These (powers) can help a yogi lead an ethical life, 
 free from disturbances” (Ranganathan 2008:254). 
 
 “Hence the appearance of minuteness and so forth, perfection of the body, and 
 unassailability of its dharma” (Chapple and Viraj 1990:100). 
 
The “‘unassailability of its dharma’ refers to the yogi’s ability to maintain a particular 
embodiment without the normal limits imposed by his experience of the elements” 
(Chapple and Viraj 1990:100). This is completely in keeping with the idea that 
dharma/dharmin represents the essential natural elements of a physical thing. Since the 
“whole of the phenomenal world is a play of the Panca-bhuta” mastery of the five 
elements will naturally lead to the yogi “becoming one with the Divine Consciousness” 
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and this alignment will allow the yogi to exercise “Divine powers” (Taimni 1986:358). 
Taimni here highlights that this is in accord with the Vedantic idea that “verily, all is 
Brahman” (ibid). The earth does not resist the working of the yogi’s body and there is a 
distinct hint here that the yogi will know the essential nature of any object he comes 
into contact with. Ranganathan adds that the yogi can now “carry on their practice 
according to dharma or ethics” (2008:254). Since at this stage the yogi seems to be 
working with rtam (accordance to the cosmic order), one might question if this means 
ethics, but we shall leave that for the time being. 
 
Is Dharma used as a synonym for morality within the Yoga Sutras? 
 
As mentioned earlier the polyvalent meanings of dharma present us with many 
challenges when translating the YS. Is dharma used within the YS as a synonym for 
morality as Ranganathan suggests? In most of the modern day Western countries a 
division, of differing levels of subtlety, exists between church and state. As a result one 
can detect lines of separation between morality, as a philosophical question, and 
religion. There exists “in the West a rather narrow view of what is ethics or ethical, 
based on roughly mingling utilitarianism and traditional Judaeo-Christian values” 
(Sutton 2000:293). Various philosophical movements, such as Humanism and 
Consequentialism, have developed secular moral frameworks outside of the context of 
religion. Indeed the argument that religion is, or should be, the sole source for morality 
has been seen as highly questionable by many in the West since at least the times of 
Socrates (469-399 BCE). Statistics often suggest that Christians in the West behave less 
morally than atheists. For example an January 8, 2000 article in the Denver Post, cited 
statistics that show that members of U.S.-based religious groups were more likely to 
divorce, a practice forbidden in all but the most extreme circumstances by the Bible, 
than atheists. The division between morality and religion was less evident in previous 
eras and it is possible to argue that this separation did not exist at all in some pre-
industrial societies. The division is still not as evident in some societies today, for 
instance in much of the Islamic world. In India at the time of the MB we know that no 
rigid distinction was “observed between secular and spiritual spheres of life” and that it 
was believed that “society should be structured and governed in accordance with 
divinely ordained regulations” (Sutton 2000:57). Historically the term dharma appears 
to functions a synonym for religion as well as for morality in the Indian subcontinent. 
And all religion, in this sense, can be seen to pertain to morality. Dharma is not just a 
Taylor-Rugman: Dharmamegha Samadhi in the Yoga Sutra of Patanjali. 37 
way of behaving. It is not just a law. It is not just morality. Dharma is a subtle 
combination of all of these things and more. In the MB we are repeatedly told that 
“dharmasukhsmah”, dharma is subtle. From the polygamous marriage of the five 
Pandava brothers to Draupadi, to the disrobing of Draupudi by the Kaurava Duhsasana, 
and the battlefield antics of Krishna, the epic again and again reminds us that to act 
correctly, effectively “with dharma”, is subtle and open to various and often 
contradictory interpretations. This ambiguity presents individuals, as moral agents, with 
difficult choices. To act dharmically is not just to accept the existing rules but also to 
interpret those rules in relation to the situation that the moral agent finds themselves in. 
 
 “Time and again when a character finds that every available moral choice is the 
 wrong  choice, or when one of the good guys does something obviously very 
 wrong, he will mutter  or be told, ‘Dharma is subtle’ (sukshma), thin and slippery 
 as a fine silk sari, elusive as a will-o’-the-wisp, internally inconsistent as well as 
 disguised, hidden, masked” (Doniger 2009:278). 
 
The idea that dharmamegha samadhi is the “Rain Cloud of Morality Liberating State of 
Absorption” (Ranganathan 2008:299) gives the clear implication that at this stage of the 
individual yoga practitioner’s development there is a perfection of morality within the 
yogi and that leads to liberation. There appears here to be the assumption by 
Ranganathan that there is a universal, all-encompassing dharma or morality to which all 
people, at all times, subscribe, despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary in the 
MB, which clearly sees the shifting, circumstantial nature of what is dharmic and 
adharmic, often dependent upon one’s svadharma (personal obligations to society). 
Ranganathan refers to the yama rules (YS 2.29ff), which he translates as “moral 
conduct” (2008:165), contained in the YS. These yama rules, also referred to as the 
mahavrata-s (great vows) are, according to Ranganathan’s translation of Patanjali (YS 
2.31) universal in application.  
 
 jati-desa-kala-samayanavacchinnah sarva-bhauma mahavratam 
 
 “This Great Duty (adherence to the yama rules) is to be followed throughout the 
 world, irrespective of station at birth, country or place, time or custom”  
 (Ranganathan 2008:169). 
 
According to Ranganathan translation there is no question in Patanjali’s mind that all 
people can adhere to these yama rules regardless of race, culture or time. But given that 
Patanjali lived around 2,000 years ago, in a period of limited travel, how much authority 
to inclusiveness can this statement about the universality of the yama rules claim? It is 
highly unlikely that Patanjali knew the customs and habits of peoples outside of  his 
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immediate geographical area, so his ability to see if these yama rules held sway cross-
culturally, “throughout the world” as Ranganathan phrases it, is remote. It is unlikely 
that Patanjali had any cross-cultural anthropological knowledge. Even if Patanjali is 
claiming that the yama rules are all encompassing he is making assumptions based on 
his own, extremely limited, knowledge. There is an Indian historical precedent for the 
idea of a general, universal of dharma within India. The famous Indian Emperor 
Ashoka (ca. 304-232 BCE) tried to “define a dharma that could be all things to all men, 
a dharma/dhamma so general (sadharana, ‘held in common’), so perpetual (sanatana) 
that it applied to all right-thinking people always, transcending the differences between 
the various sects” (Doniger 2009:285). To what extent he succeeded in establishing this 
perpetual, general dharma over his subjects is debatable and his influence certainly 
seems to rapidly wane with his death. Depending upon how you translate the Sanskrit a 
rather different emphasis can be drawn from YS 2.31 however.  
 
 “When not limited by life-state, place, time, or circumstances in all occasions 
 [these constitute] the great vow” (Chapple and Viraj 1990:22). 
 
This translation seems is far more in keeping with the yogic message espoused by 
Krishna contained in the BG about what is dharmic and adharmic. It is reasonable to 
argue that the BG was known to the author of the YS. In the BG Krishna urges His 
disciple Anjuna to fight in the fratricidal war at Kurukshetra. Anjuna is told by his 
guru/charioteer that not to fight would be adharmic. In this case Krishna is clearly 
saying that the practice of yoga, characterised by nishkama karma (action without 
desire), is compatible with the undertaking of one’s svadharma (personal duty), 
proscribed by one’s situation at birth within the jati and varna systems.  
 
 “Krishna’s declaration to Arjuna in the Gita that ‘it is better to do your own duty 
 poorly than another’s well’ (echoed in Manu [10.97]) ignored the fact that 
 Arjuna’s own duty as a warrior would forever doom him to relative inferiority 
 vis-a-vis Brahmins whose sva-dharma just happened to conform with the 
 universal dharma that dictated nonviolence” (Doniger 2009:287).  
 
Patanjali may well be arguing for a universal yama system to be adopted by all yoga 
practitioners, but we can see clearly that texts written contemporaneously with the YS 
clearly suggest that this was not a universally held view by all yoga philosophers, 
teachers and practitioners. The BG is revolutionary in its statement that yoga can be 
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practiced by householders whereas Patanjali’s intended audience is unclear. It is 
reasonable to infer that Patanjali described and proscribed the yama rules for those 
practicing Yoga exclusively. It is impossible to say definitively whether or not he 
intended the yama rules to be applied by those not undertaking Yoga practice. The sutra 
style with its minimum amount of words makes it difficult to accurately assess exactly 
what Patanjali means here. Taimni (1961:218-220) lays a lot of emphasis on these 
mahavrata but it would appear from his commentary on YS 2.30–31 that he sees the 
yama vows as being pertinent to the practitioner of yoga alone and that these vows do 
not, necessarily, extend to wider society. They are therefore specific, not universal and 
general. These yama and niyama rules and the brahmavihara-s of YS 1.33 are perhaps 
specifically forms of yoga practice that are best viewed as “accessories for cleaning the 
mind” (Dasgupta 1989:119) of their existing samskaras rather than as tools to live 
successfully within society. These disciplines “represent the mental endeavours to 
cleanse the mind and to make if fit for the proper manifestation of sraddha, etc., and 
thus to steady it towards attaining the true discriminative knowledge” (ibid:120). It is 
this discriminative knowledge which characterises the dharmamegha. Ranganathan is 
not alone in suggesting that the sadhana (spiritual journey) of the yoga practitioner is a 
morally infused one. Whicher (1998[a]:287) argues that the “yogin’s spiritual journey – 
far from being an ‘amoral process’ is a highly moral process” but he balances this view 
by accepting that personal morality can be quite different from a societal ethic. The idea 
of the universality of morality in Indian society as supposed by Ranganathan is a 
questionable assumption. With no central religious authority such as the Roman 
Catholic Vatican, no universally accepted texts, and no universally agreed points of 
dogma, Indian society and its religious practices have always tended towards the local 
and the immediate community rather than the universal. “One of the basic arguments of 
modern Western moral philosophers, especially since Kant, has been that a sound moral 
system must be universally applicable in order to be worthy of the name” (Dhand 
202:347). But does this extend to India? I believe that we can challenge Ranganathan’s 
assertion that the mahavrata-s extend to include everyone in all circumstances as 
viewing Indian texts through Western-tainted spectacles. 
 
Morality, from the Latin mores, refers to the customs and habits of a group and has both 
descriptive and proscriptive qualities. It is usually used interchangeably with ethics and 
ethical, from the ancient Greek ethos. Any specific group, at a particular place and time, 
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have a set of commonly held beliefs and customs which evolve over time. Morality is 
never fixed. Glucklich, discussing Indian morality of the Epic period, points out that   
 
“there are rules against shooting someone – even an enemy – in the back. And 
there are rules for Brahmins against sinning – at the cost of losing one's caste 
and funeral rites. But both the ancient and the modern heroes were locked on the 
horns of ethical dilemmas they could solve only tentatively. How can a modern 
ethicist move from the specific rules of dharmic conduct to more general 
principles of justification, both in order to resolve ethical conflicts and to 
understand the basic moral values of Indian society?” (1999:463). 
 
Rama, the hero of the Ramayana, is seen throughout India as the great champion of 
dharma in its most general meaning. Rama sought the assistance of the monkey army of 
Kishkindha whilst searching for his wife Sita when she had been kidnapped by Ravana. 
Rama made a pact with Sugriva, the usurper to the throne of Kishkindha. He promised 
to kill the rightful monkey king Vali and allow Sugriva to rule. Sugriva engaged Vali in 
battle and, at an opportune moment, Rama shot Vali in the back with an arrow. As 
Glucklich points out above, there are rules against this sort of thing. And there are also 
rules about killing kings. Yet however adharmically Rama acts when he kills Vali, the 
end of regaining his wife Sita is seen dharmically to justify the means. Even though a 
huge body of dharmasastra-s exists that are theoretically concerned with the role of 
dharma in everyday life “Hindu moral ideals, universal and particular, are encoded into 
the personalities of epic characters, and I believe that it is by focusing here that any 
discussion of Hindu ethical theory will bear its most fruitful results” (Dhand 2002:369). 
We must be careful not to look at aspects of South Asian texts “in isolation from the 
ethical frameworks in which they are embedded” (Hibbets 1999:457) as there can 
obviously be differences in the understanding of what it means to take seriously 
“indigenous theoretical frameworks on ethical topics produced by the traditions 
themselves” (ibid:438). We can only accurately examine ethical frameworks within 
their cultural and historical context. What is ethical and moral in one epoch may be 
totally unethical in another time and place.  
 
Ranganathan believes that the “common problem with translations of Indian philosophy 
is that they fail to retain the moral philosophical significance of the Indian philosophical 
tradition” (2008:2) and this results in the “marginalization of the ethical or moral 
content of Indian philosophy” (ibid:3). He attributes this marginalization to Western 
colonial and cultural imperialism and this has led, he argues to the situation where 
ethics is seen by Western academics to be “poorly represented in the history of Indian 
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philosophy” a view that is “historically wrong” (ibid:4). But is this really the case? 
“There is no ready equivalent in Hindu discourse to the Western theological and 
philosophical discipline of ‘moral philosophy’” (Johnson 2009: entry under ‘ethics’). 
However this should not obscure the fact that  
 
“ethics in the more general sense – how individuals and societies as a whole 
should behave in relation to each other, and in relation to the power or powers 
that are thought to govern life, time, and the universe – are, of course, as 
essential to Hindu traditions as they are to all other cultures” (ibid). 
 
Within the Hindu literature “the formal discussion of principles and rules governing 
correct behaviour is most obvious in the dharma literature” (ibid). Johnson and Dhand 
may see different genres of Indian texts as the best source for examining ethics and 
morality in Hinduism, but neither suggests that philosophical works from the six astika 
darsana or the various nastika darsana are major factors. To see a pseudo-Christian, all 
encompassing morality or dharma within a particular Indian text or set of texts, as 
Ranganathan seems to be doing with the YS, is often to do the text in question a 
disservice. It is also a view that has been foisted onto indigenous Indian systems of 
thought as  
 
“the question of to what extent, dharma represents a system of universal as 
opposed to particular, or context-bound values (sadharana-dharma vs 
varnasrama-dharma) has exercised various Neo-Hindu in the 19th and 20th 
centuries, especially in the face of challenges from Protestant Christian 
missionaries who claimed to have access to the uniquely saving truth” (ibid).  
 
The very idea of a universal, Christian-style, dharma is variously challenged within the 
Indian traditions. The practices of Tantra, for instance, operate within a different 
contextual and sociological framework to other Indian traditions.  
 
Vamacarin-s (left-handed Tantrics) use the panchamakara, the five M substances, in 
their sadhana. These are the consumption of madya (wine), mamsa (meat), matsya 
(fish), mudra (parched grain), and the undertaking of maithuna, (ritualised sexual 
intercourse). The panchamakara are seen as highly adharmic by the wider Hindu 
tradition. They are however only utilised in particular circumstances and by specific 
people. The actions of Tantric-s, people who consider themselves and are considered by 
others as yogis, is not supported by the interpretation of dharma as being universal. It is 
clearly context that makes an act moral or immoral, dharmic or adharmic. The yogi, 
regardless of his tradition “is said to be attached to neither virtue nor non-virtue, and is 
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no longer oriented within the egological patterns of thought as in the epistemically 
distorted condition of samyoga” or normal day-to-day contact with material, 
conditioned existence (Whicher 1998[a]:287). When discussing the dharmamegha stage 
the YS tells us that the samskara-s have been burnt away, implying that the yogi is 
acting spontaneously, rather than from a position of conditioning. We might then 
conclude that normal, human conventions or morals will not apply to the yogi at this 
stage, but this burning away of the samskara-s  
 
 “does not mean, as some scholars have misleadingly concluded, that the spiritual 
 adept or yogin is free to commit immoral acts, or that the yogin is motivated by 
 selfish concerns. Actions must not only be executed in the spirit of unselfishness 
 (i.e., sacrifice) or detachment, they must also be ethically sound, reasonable, and 
 justifiable. If action were wholly contingent upon one’s mood or frame of mind, 
 it would constitute a legitimate pretext for immoral conduct” (ibid). 
 
We have examined the usage of dharmamegha samadhi in a variety of other texts and 
been largely unable to reach a satisfactory conclusion about the term’s deeper meaning. 
In the YS dharma seems to be used in a specific, qualified manner. “The appearance is 
called the dharma (the attribute) and that particular arrangement of atoms or gunas 
which is the basis of the particular appearance is called the dharmin (the substance). 
The change of appearance is, therefore, called the dharmaparinama (change of 
attributes)” (Dasgupta 1989:60). If we imagine some earth, we can see it as being in a 
variety of forms: as dust, as a lump of mud and as a jug. The essential ‘earth’ is the 
same (dharmin) but it undergoes changes in quality called dharmaparinama. Its present 
form and quality, its dharma, has the potential for future states to exist. This view is 
supported by the majority of other scholars. For example, Taimni, when examining YS 
3.13, 14, 45 and 4.12 and 29 (1986:301, 304, 403, 431) translates dharma as ‘property’ 
or ‘properties’. There is no mention or indication of dharma having any ethical or moral 
component in this text. He supports Dasgupta’s view that dharma is used in a special, 
technical, philosophical sense within the YS rather than in a more vernacular sense. The 
various properties or dharma-s are “all inherent in Prakrti” (ibid:405) and are “nothing 
but different combinations of the three primary Gunas” (ibid:408). It is the action of the 
bhuta-s (the elements) and the effect this action produces on the indriya-s (sense 
organs) that produce sensuous perceptions, and “these properties in their totality are 
called Dharma in the present context” (ibid:302). 
 
Ranganathan would initially seem to agree with this view when he says that “if one 
wishes to translate philosophy, one must acquire an institutional knowledge of the 
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textual features of philosophy.” He adds that although philosophers present “different 
theories in philosophical texts … what remains constant is the criterion that connects the 
use of … key philosophical terms with the theories that they are used to articulate and 
debate” (2008:13). In other words, thinkers from various, sometimes contradictory, 
traditions might disagree about how to interpret phenomena, but the meanings and 
definitions that they individually ascribe to words remain constant so that informed 
debate on key issues rather than on semantics can take place. Indian philosophers, 
Ranganathan assures us, “did use ‘dharma’ to articulate theories that they chose for their 
social implications” and this “generality holds across the board among Indian 
philosophical schools” (ibid:14). Additionally, Ranganathan reassures us that dharma 
“in all its variegated uses in Indian philosophy, is the correlate of ‘ethical’ or ‘moral’” 
(ibid:21) and that yoga practice in the YS is geared “to moral perfection” (ibid:23). This 
view can clearly be disputed however from a reading of texts from other darsana. 
Dhand (202:348) points out that “we know that Hinduism involves dharma.” He then 
asks the pertinent questions “does it also do ethics?” and “Are dharma and ethics the 
same thing? How are they similar and how different? What are the points of 
convergence and difference between the two?” He goes on to argue that philosophical 
inquiry into Hindu ethics is a modern activity and adds that in India as a whole there 
was no interest in systematic discussions of ethics per se. 
 
There is a scholarly consensus that no one, single English term adequately expresses the 
subtleness and polyvalence of the meaning of dharma. Ethics is, according to Dhand 
(202:347), a “Western term, developed as a discipline in Western philosophy” and a 
range of assumptions are embedded in its use. Dhand goes on to argue that “one of the 
concerns of Western moral philosophy, at least as far back as the Stoics but particularly 
in modern times has been to has been to identify universal principles upon which 
systems of ethics may be based” (ibid:348). The implication of this is that the general is 
preferred to the particular and the specific. Systems which are more encompassing and 
inclusive are therefore, according to this idea, better. Ethics and morality concern 
themselves with two key questions “What we ought to do? and “Why we ought to do 
it?” (Perrett 1998:1). Ethical theories therefore present us with two essential 
components, “a theory of the Right and a theory of the Good” (ibid). In the West 
various thinkers have come up with answers to these questions that are universal to all 
moral agents and apply to their relationships with other moral agents. In India “schools 
such as Samkhya and Yoga ... are in agreement about what constitutes the good: moksa, 
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‘freedom’, ‘liberation’, ‘release’” (Dhand 2002:350). The source of moral codes for 
these schools is the same: the Vedas. Philosophical arguments are therefore held within 
the parameters of a religious, Vedically-inspired backdrop and are “orientated towards 
moksa” (ibid) however that is specifically described by the darsana in question. 
Western philosophers tend to speak about moral agents as being equal within society 
and examine rules that are universally applicable to all agents at all times. Indian 
thought places more emphasis upon the moral agent’s wider identity within the society; 
one is not simply a moral agent, a person, but rather must fit into an “idealized system 
of class and life stage (varna-ashrama-dharma)” (Doniger 2009:29). An individual is a 
member of a community, a varna, and is living at one of the four stages of life 
(ashrama). That moral agent therefore has duties incumbent upon them relative to their 
stage of life and situation. Indian dharma rules are therefore contextual not general. The 
dharma duties that are prescribed for a male Brahmana student during the 
brahmachari-ashrama will be quite different for those described when he enters the 
grihasta-ashrama or householder stage. And a kshatriya will have different duties 
again. “Implicit in this understanding of the moral agent is the contention that codes of 
conduct are not generalizable to all human beings. An act that may be very wrong for 
one person in a given situation may be quite defensible for another person” (ibid:352). 
Codes of behaviour are relative to the right time, the right place and only for the correct 
amount of time. 
 
These differences between the constitution, and therefore the duties, of a moral agent 
are explained via the theory of the three guna-s. Differences in the ratios of the guna-s 
within each individual moral agent at any particular time determine which particular 
dharma-s are applicable to that moral agent and therefore varying codes of moral 
conduct are expected and accepted.  
If we accept that the “true principle of Yoga is the setting of the mind on one truth, 
principle or object” (Dasgupta 1989:110) then we can see, by examining the YS that this 
one truth is discriminative knowledge. Therefore the “yogangas not only remove the 
impurities of the mind but help the mind by removing obstacles to attain the highest 
perfection of discriminate knowledge” (ibid:117). We can then see that in the fourth and 
final YS chapter, the Kaivalya-Pada, “‘aloneness’ (kaivalya) is said to ensue upon the 
attainment of dharmamegha-samadhi, the ‘cloud of dharma’ samadhi. This samadhi 
follows from the discriminative discernment (vivekakhyata) and is the precursor to 
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‘aloneness’” Whicher (1998[a]:284). When this knowledge dawns we see the “rise of 
dharmamegha,” whereby “the succession of the changes of the mental states is over” 
(ibid). At this point the yogi reaches a state of “absolute freedom when the gunas return 
to the pradhana, their primal cause” (Dasgupta 1989:103). The limbs of Yoga, the 
yoganga-s “help the maturity of the yogic process by gradually increasing the lustre of 
knowledge. They represent the means by which even an ordinary mind (viksiptacitta) 
may gradually purify the mind and make it fit for the highest ideals of Yoga” (ibid:114). 
 
Conclusion 
 
This dissertation has examined the meaning of the term dharmamegha samadhi within 
the YS and attempted to establish a clear and precise translation of term. Building off 
this I have explored Ranganathan’s hypothesis that dharma functions as an exact 
synonym of the English term morality and that the entire yoga project outlined in the YS 
is geared towards the moral perfection of the yogic practitioner characterised in the 
dharmamegha samadhi stage. Patanjali mainly draws his ontology and epistemology 
from Sankhya and despite differences to the later canonical SK I believe we should view 
the YS as Patanjala Sankhya; an elaboration of Sankhya described by Patanjali.  
 
Given the current scholarship it is challenging to arrive at a satisfactory understanding 
of the dharmamegha state of consciousness. I see three key reasons for this. Firstly, the 
bias towards the first half of the YS  means that limited scholarship exists on 
dharmamegha samadhi. Secondly, it is unclear whether dharmamegha is a synonym for 
asamprajnata samadhi or exists as an intermediate state between asamprajnata and 
kaivalyam. Vyasa’s bhasya states that when the “seeds of subliminal-impressions” have 
dwindled and that other thoughts no longer arise, that the yogi is in a state of 
“discriminative-discernment” and is free of desires (Rukmani 1989:121). Vyasa does 
not directly link the dharmamegha state to being either the end of samprajnata and 
hence the asamprajnata state. Neither does he indicate that dharmamegha is a stage 
above asamprajnata. The YS and the bhasya are inconclusive and are open to a variety 
of interpretations. In YS 1.2 Vyasa’s bhasya indicates that asamprajnata and 
dharmamegha are two of a multitude of terms referring to the same state of 
consciousness. “It is difficult to reconcile the technically precise requirements that all 
things be restrained (nirodha) with the more poetic proclamations of cloud of dharma 
samadhi” and to decide whether these two things are “competing goals or different 
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descriptions of the same experience” Chapple and Viraj (1990:11). Patanjali has 
“purposefully presented an artful array of possibilities” whereby techniques “coexist in 
complementarity, not competition” (ibid:15).  The aim of the yogic project is clearly 
stated to be cittavrttinirodhah, the cessation of the mental modifications (YS 1.2). 
Above that, the precise technical details become confusing. This argues against 
Ranganathan’s claim that moral perfection is the YS’s cornerstone. Thirdly, the limited 
use of dharmamegha makes it difficult to construct a meaningful cross-textual 
understanding the state it refers to. The Upanisads mirror Patanjali, describing how in 
the dharmamegha state the karma-s and samskara-s are extinguished and that dharma 
rains down. The characteristics of this dharma are uncertain. Dharmamegha is used 
widely by Buddhists in connection with the bhumi-s but these references do not help us 
gain greater clarity. I believe that we are too removed from Patanjali in time to 
conclusively arrive at a full understanding of the dharmamegha and the consciousness it 
describes. Patanjali uses dharma it in its philosophical, technical meaning, denoting the 
essence or combination of gunic qualities within an entity throughout the YS. Extending 
this definition of dharma to the dharmamegha is possible, but this does not seem to 
adequately express the full meaning of the dharmamegha samadhi state.  
 
I believe the dharmamegha state is an extension of the asamprajnata state where all of 
the residual habitual tendencies (samskara-s) have been destroyed. The asamprajnata 
state alluded to in YS 1.17-18 seems to leave the yogi in the position of still having 
stores of samskara-s remaining. Vyasa’s bhasya would indicate that even the samskara-
s are burned up in the dharmamegha state. It would therefore appear that, as Whicher 
argues, dharmamegha is a more refined form of asamprajnata which directly precedes 
kaivalyam. Taimni supports this when he says that on entering the dharmamegha state 
the yogi is like a “pilot in an aeroplane who comes out of a cloud bank into the bright 
sunlight and begins to see everything clearly” (1986:433). Surely this is the moment 
when the seer of YS 1.3 is resting in his true nature and that “Dharma-Megha-Samadhi, 
therefore, means the final Samadhi in which the Yogi shakes himself free from the 
world of Dharmas which obscure reality like a cloud.” Ranganathan opposes most 
scholarship in denying that samprajnata and asamprajnata are samadhi states, but I feel 
that his reasoning here is unconvincing.  
 
The usage of dharma in the YS leads me to believe that the word is used in its 
philosophical technical sense where dharmi is the collection of all properties within an 
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object. Dharma describes the essential nature of a thing. YS 1.3 tells us that when the 
mind is stilled the seer rests in its true nature. Translating dharma to mean true nature, 
untainted by samskara and vasana, seems to make sense. It seems likely that the 
purusa’s true nature would be free of arbitrary, societal constraints rather than morally 
perfected. When Hamlet tells Rosencrantz that “there is nothing either good or bad, but 
thinking makes it so. To me it is a prison” (Hamlet, Act 2, scene 2, 239–251) he 
expresses the idea that our conditioning or thinking is responsible for our interpretation 
of events. When the seer is resting in its true nature the samskara-s or conditioned 
modes of thinking have been eliminated and the yogi clearly sees action and inaction for 
what they are. This is clearly indicated in the BG, a text almost certainly known to 
Patanjali. In BG 4.18 Krishna tells Anjuna that “He who perceives inaction in action, 
And action in inaction, Is wise among men; He is a yogi and performs all action.” 
Krishna then adds that (BG 4.19) this yogi has “consumed his karma in the fire of 
knowledge, Him the wise men call a sage” (Sargeant 1994). This sounds very similar to 
the ideas of Patanjali about dharmamegha; a stage where the karma-s are no longer 
operating and a state where action takes place, but in an manner untainted by previous 
conditioning. 
 
Ranganathan’s assertion that dharma is consistently used in the YS as a synonym of 
morality and that the entire yogic process is one that results in the moral perfection of 
the practitioner is, to me, highly problematic. Ranganathan unequivocally insists that all 
Indian philosophy contains a moral element. He is constantly seeking to establish the 
validity and worth of Indian philosophy in comparison to Western philosophy, almost at 
the expense of overlooking India’s unique cultural heritage and contribution.  
 
“The installation of the YS as the Classical Yoga text in the modern age is 
bound  up with several dialectically interlinked, ideological currents. These 
include colonial transition projects intended to inculcate the critical habits and 
values of European philosophy in Indian minds via Hindu scripture and 
subsequent reclamations of these texts by Indian cultural nationalists seeking to 
identify and interpret the definitive canon of modern Hinduism” (Singleton 
2008:77).  
 
I believe that Ranganathan’s work displays many of these features. His hypothesis rests 
on too many unsupported assumptions and he produces no conclusive evidence to 
support his claims. There appears to be no equivalent Sanskrit term to adequately 
express Western notions of morality and ethics within classical Indian philosophy. 
These terms, and many more, come under the broader banner of dharma within Indian 
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thought. It is not that Indian thought does not do ethics and morality, it just does it 
differently. I have demonstrated this idea of philosophy being both universal and 
generalised is a characteristic of Western, not Indian, forms of philosophy. The work of 
Dhand and others clearly demonstrates that even today modes of behaviour within India 
are not seen as universals but are delineated and proscribed by one’s individual situation 
at any given time. In his introduction Ranganathan argues that “one of the most serious 
problems affecting contemporary scholarship on Indian philosophy is the 
marginalization of the ethical or moral content of Indian philosophy” (2008:3). 
Ranganathan privileging ideas gleaned from Western philosophy, most notably the 
notion of the universality of ethical and moral norms above a closer examination of 
Indian philosophy which, I would argue, clearly proposes moral frameworks, but moral 
frameworks determined individually according to one’s situation. It is certain that in 
previous eras “some Hindus took pride in every aspect of Hinduism that appealed to 
Europeans”, and held up a “sanitized brand of Hinduism that is now often labelled as 
sanatana dharma, ‘perpetual, eternal and universal’ Hinduism, although that term was 
previously used in a very different sense” (Doniger 2009:598). Certain Westerners 
continue to examine Hinduism through a Eurocentric lens, rather than letting the texts 
speak. Attempting to bring morality into the yogic endeavour implies that the yogi is 
concerned with the world at large, yet “the Yogasutra seems to be interested in the 
benefit of the dharmamegha samadhi for the sake of the yogin only: his klesa and 
karman are eradicated, his knowledge is infinitely enlarged, his kaivalya is secured, 
which means the attainment of ‘being his true self’” (Klostermaier 1986:260). 
 
Ranganathan argues that the “marginalization of the moral philosophical content of 
Indian philosophy” by scholars and others “has thus always been in the interests of 
western domination” (2008:3). I doubt the veracity of this claim. Ranganathan’s 
translation appears to offer a reading of the YS which resonates with the Judeo-Christian 
ideas of morality of his intended readership; American and European MPY 
practitioners. Making a translation meaningful to its intended readers by foisting a range 
of suppositions onto the text is unhelpful and leads to misrepresentations of the source 
text. Ranganathan’s desire to install ideas of a universal morality seems to require his 
reading into the text ideas that no other scholarly text I consulted supported. YS 1.2 is an 
example of Ranganathan inserting additional words into his translation to change the 
meaning of the sutra in question.  A style of pseudo-Christian morality is, for 
Ranganathan, at the heart of the yogic journey. I have demonstrated that there is little 
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support for this view within the wider academic community, nor is this view supported 
by many of the more populist, less academic translations available that I consulted. 
Ranganathan’s view clearly sets him up as a polemicist, but whilst one may laud his 
courage I have argued that I do not feel there is sufficient weight to his claims to accept 
them unquestioningly. 
 
In conclusion I would suggest that it is difficult, even after consulting a number of 
translations of the YS and also examining a variety of wider sources, to come to a 
complete and truly meaningful translation of the term dharmamegha. The evidence 
suggests that dharma is used in the YS to indicate the essential nature and properties of a 
thing. Ranganathan’s view is worthy of consideration, lest we run the risk of 
misrepresenting Patanjali by not taking into consideration a wider definition. It appears 
to me more likely that at the pinnacle of the yogic journey “the insight into the nature of 
everything as ‘dharmic’ is irrevocable: the purusa will never be able to mistake any 
particular object as real after the unreality (in ultimate terms) of everything has been 
intuited” (Klostermaier 1986:261). At the state of dharmamegha rather than being 
confined to behave and conform within a man made system of morality the yogi is able 
to clearly distinguish Self from non-Self and behave with all of the spontaneity and 
freedom that the Highest Reality allows.  
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